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1 Introduction
The development of natural language process-
ing (henceforth, nlp) systems has reached
the stage where concentrated efforts are nec-
essary in the area of representing more ‘ab-
stract’, more ‘knowledge’-related bodies of in-
formation. It has been accepted that with-
out substantial bodies of background infor-
mation concerning commonsense, everyday
knowledge about the world or detailed in-
formation concerning particular domains of
application, it will not be possible to con-
struct systems that can support the use of
natural language. Systems need to repre-
sent concrete details of the ‘worlds’ that their
texts describe: for example, the resolution of
anaphors, the induction of text coherence by
recognizing regularities present in the world
and not in the text, the recognition of plans
by knowing what kinds of plans make sense for
speakers and hearers in real situations, etc. all
require world modelling to various depths.
This need creates two interrelated problem
areas. The first problem is how knowledge
of the world — be it general, commonsense
knowledge or specialized knowledge concern-
ing some particular domain — is to be rep-
resented. The second problem is how such
organizations of knowledge are to be related
to linguistic system levels of organization such
as grammar and lexis. For both problem ar-
eas the concept of ontologies for nlp has
been suggested to be of potential value. Very
generally, an ontology offers a ‘conceptual’
framework for the representation of informa-
tion — a framework that is sufficiently gen-
eral, but also sufficiently detailed, to provide
a rich supportive scaffolding for the construc-
tion of models of the world. The design of
such ontologies constitutes an area of concern
that is coming to be known as ontological en-
gineering (e.g., [Nirenburg and Raskin, 1987,
Lenat and Guha, 1988, Simmons, 1991]. As
we shall see below, most systems that deal
currently with nlp already adopt some kind
of ontology for their more abstract levels of
information. However, theoretical principles
for the design and development of ontologies
meeting the goals of generality and detail re-
main weak. This is due not only to a lack
of theoretical accounts at these more rarified
abstract levels of information, but also to the
co-existence of a range of, sometimes poorly
differentiated, functions such bodies of infor-
mation are expected to fulfill.
The following list gives an idea of the range
of functions adopted in nlp. Ontologies are
often expected to fulfill at least one (and often
more) of:
• organizing ‘world knowledge’,
• organizing the world itself,
• organizing ‘meaning’ or ‘semantics’ of
natural language expressions,
• providing an interface between system
external components, domain models,
etc. and nlp linguistic components,
• ensuring expressability of input expres-
sions,
• offering an interlingua for machine trans-
lation,
• supporting the construction of ‘concep-
tual dictionaries’.
Moreover, an ontology is seen as a very gen-
eral organizational device: i.e., one that pro-
vides a classification system for whatever area
of application the ontology is applied to. The
organizational resource offered by an ontology
has to be re-usable. But it is an open issue as
to what extent the kinds of organization listed
here overlap. It cannot be taken for granted
that they all refer to the same level of ab-
stract description. It can also not be taken
for granted that there is unity concerning the
tasks that are involved in such descriptions.
This can be seen in the following statement
from Hobbs.
‘Semantics is the attempted specifica-
tion of the relation between language
and the world. However, this requires
a theory of the world. There is a spec-
trum of choices one can make in this
regard. At one end of the spectrum —
let’s say the right end — one can adopt
the “correct” theory of the world, the
one given by quantum mechanics and
the other sciences. If one does this, se-
mantics becomes impossible because it
is no less than all of science. . . There’s
too much of a mismatch between the
way we view the world and the way
the world really is. At the left end,
one can assume a theory of the world
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that is isomorphic to the way we talk
about it. . . .Most activity in seman-
tics today is slightly to the right of
the extreme left end of this spectrum.
. . . it fails to move far enough away
from language to represent significant
progress towards the right end of the
spectrum.’ [Hobbs, 1985, p68]
It probably does not make sense, therefore,
to talk of a generalized classification system
without first fixing more precisely the nature
of its intended function. A further problem is
that the first of the desired functions above,
organizing world knowledge, is often taken to
be definitional for an ontology.2 However, the
world — i.e., psychological, logical, or philo-
sophical views of the world — has not proved
to be very constraining as to what knowledge
organizations it requires. ‘Ontologies’ built on
the basis of such constraints are, as we shall
see below, underconstrained and there has ac-
cordingly been no achievement of the large
scale resources necessary for re-use across nlp
systems.
The main purpose of this paper is to add
a further round of discussion to that con-
cerning the design and construction of ontolo-
gies for nlp. The paper is explicitly explo-
rative, building on experience in the definition
and use of such ontologies for text generation.
The paper is intended to stimulate discussion,
rather than present solutions — although I
do conclude with suggestions for certain lines
of theoretically motivated methodological de-
velopment for future ontologies. The basic
path taken in the paper will be to differenti-
ate among the distinct functions that ontolo-
gies may serve in order to be better able to set
out principles and constraints for the design of
abstract levels of knowledge organization that
can serve as ontologies appropriate for nlp.
Seen in more detail, the paper is organized as
follows.
First, I discuss the role of language as a pos-
sible motivating force for designing and pop-
ulating ontologies. Second, I introduce sev-
eral of the most extensive ontologies that are
currently to be found in nlp systems, char-
acterizing their precise function and motiva-
tion within their respective systems. Third,
I relate the distinct types of ontology discov-
2Or the second may be claimed to be the real task
— however, as Hobbs points out, this actually comes
closer to the first position.
ered to possible general linguistic theories that
would support them. It is my contention that
many principles of organization follow directly
from the position of suggested bodies of infor-
mation in the linguistic system as a whole and
that recognizing this allows efforts in the def-
inition and construction of such bodies of or-
ganization to be directed more appropriately
than has hitherto been the case. For any on-
tology that is proposed, therefore, it should
be possible to relate its properties back to a
motivating linguistic theory. I argue that the
evidence that we now have from the more ex-
tensive attempts at ontology construction sug-
gests strongly that a richly stratified model
of the linguistic system is required in order
to achieve the degree of constraint that we
need for attacking large-scale, re-usable on-
tology construction. Fourth, I show how the
ontology of the Penman text generation sys-
tem — that has been developed largely as
an instantiation of the highly stratified the-
ory of systemic-functional linguistics — al-
ready answers many of the criticisms that
have been raised against other ontologies. I
argue that although these criticisms are of-
ten based on largely post hoc, methodological
grounds, the vast majority of them also fol-
low directly from the properties of the linguis-
tic system and so could (and arguably should)
have been made prior to attempting ontology
construction. This can be seen in the proper-
ties of the Penman ontology, whose very de-
sign avoids significant criticisms levelled else-
where. Finally, I suggest how ontology de-
sign could be improved yet further by taking
into consideration more input from linguistic
theory. The Penman ontology, for example,
is only a partial instantiation of the theoret-
ical principles underlying it and it is possible
to show that problems enter into the account
precisely where the ontology falls short of the
theoretical specification.
In general, then, this paper is intended not
only to improve our understanding of what
kinds of bodies of information can stand as
ontologies of various kinds and how such bod-
ies of information relate to other resources in
the computational representation of the lin-
guistic system, but also to make the point that
appropriate views of the rich dimensions of or-
ganization exhibited by the linguistic system
can go a long way to improving our initial
design specifications for nlp systems. They
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should, therefore, always be considered very
early on in system construction and computa-
tional theory development.
2 The role of language in
ontology justification
As mentioned above, the move to consider nlp
systems that require information over and be-
yond that attributable to surface syntax has
raised two problems: how to organize that in-
formation and how to relate that information
with the less abstract levels of the linguistic
system. The first problem is typically consid-
ered in more detail in approaches where the
operation of a system in some specified do-
main is the central goal; the second usually
arises in systems which attempt to model the
linguistic system itself, focusing less closely on
the embedding in any particular specified do-
main of application.
One common source for knowledge con-
struction and representation that is found in
approaches to the first problem is earlier work
in artificial intelligence (ai). Even early ai
reasoning programs needed to represent the
state of the world in which the programs were
to operate. This has given rise to the ar-
eas of domain modelling and common-
sense reasoning which are responsible for
representing concrete details of aspects of the
world. The enterprise of world modelling
clearly has many similarities with the require-
ments of sophisticated nlp systems and there
has naturally been an influx of techniques and
attitudes concerning ontology design from the
ai context.
This has proved most successful in the
cross-over of techniques of knowledge rep-
resentation in ai to techniques for repre-
senting linguistic information. The simi-
larity between structured inheritance knowl-
edge representation languages such as kl-
one [Brachman and Schmolze, 1985] and its
descendents and current typed feature logics
(e.g., [Smolka, 1989,
Smolka and Ai¨t-Kaci, 1989,
Nebel et al., 1991]) is an active area of re-
search. A basic model for the representation
of ontologies can now assume minimally that
a subsumption lattice over sorts is defined,
probably with some mechanism correspond-
ing to the structured inheritance of role in-
formation associated with the sorts, and pos-
sibly additional axioms, or particular infer-
ences, licenced by specified combinations of
sorts. This will be the representational basis
for ontologies of all kinds that I will assume
throughout this paper.
In contrast to this concensus, attempts to
decide exactly which sorts make sense for
an ontology based on ai ‘knowledge engi-
neering’ principles have been less successful.
Although the effort-intensive nature of do-
main modelling naturally calls for consider-
ation of the re-usability of components of
the knowledge represented across distinct do-
mains, the ability of ai-centered approaches
to come up with such general organiza-
tions has been limited. Some of the ear-
liest work in this area was that on ‘naive
physics’ (e.g., [Hayes, 1979, Hayes, 1985]):
here the aim was to capture the under-
lying ‘general knowledge’ that people have
about physical objects and substances in
the world; similar investigations are reported
in, for example, [Hobbs and Moore, 1985,
Hobbs et al., 1987], and there are naturally
also connections to be drawn with other work
in semantic and ‘conceptual’ representation in
ai, e.g., [Schank and Abelson, 1977]. Further
good examples of systems that require de-
tailed real ‘knowledge’ in particular domains
are expert systems; here also there is still lit-
tle shareability across domain models. The
detailed organization of such systems’ knowl-
edge is typically unique to particular applica-
tion domains and shows relatively little cross-
domain re-usability.
We can in part explain this by consider-
ing the relative importance assigned to the
distinct functions that such domain models
in ai are to fulfill. For example, when con-
structing a knowledge source whose primary
function is to support the particular inferences
that a given system needs to draw, it is log-
ical that the organization of that knowledge
be tailored with this goal in mind. This usu-
ally leads, however, to nongeneralizeable rep-
resentational requirements because the infer-
ences that distinct systems are to draw have
not been related. The relatively small scale of
most of this work to date has furthermore lim-
ited the effectiveness and urgency of investiga-
tions into re-usability: the cost of construct-
ing domain models from scratch has not been
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prohibitively high. This cost-equation quickly
changes once more realistically sized bodies
of information are considered. It quickly be-
comes much more important that detailed or-
ganizations of general knowledge applicable to
many domains are available so as to reduce the
work involved when moving to new domains.
The most extensive attempt to cre-
ate a general scaffolding for represent-
ing general, background knowledge of the
world based on ai techniques is the cyc
project [Lenat and Guha, 1988]. The size of
this project (initial projections were for a base
level of 10,000,000 entries) of necessity forces
a sharp awareness of the need to have an or-
ganization for knowledge that is detailed and
general enough to provide sufficient scaffold-
ing for supporting large-scale bodies of infor-
mation in accessible and usable ways. With-
out clear principles both for the organiza-
tion of such knowledge and for the selection
of the information to be represented, the re-
sult would be disastrous: poorly organized
knowledge will be inadequate both theoreti-
cally, in that it fails to capture significant gen-
eralizations, and practically, in that it fails
to be usable as a resource. The procedure
followed in cyc is to divide up types of en-
tities into categories that appear to behave
differently, i.e., concepts are classified accord-
ing to the kinds of inferences that they al-
low to be drawn about themselves. Problem-
atic here, therefore, is precisely which kinds
of inferences are to be taken as definitional.
This does not appear to have been made ex-
plicit and so the procedure does not provide a
particularly sound methodology. The result-
ing domain-independent, and hence re-usable,
portion of the cyc ontology is accordingly not
very deep, somewhat tangled, and supports
limited inferences. It then becomes increas-
ingly necessary to raise questions concerning
the consistency of distinct areas of knowledge
represented and, consequently, how one can
use that knowledge.
It needs to be recognized that it is essen-
tial to define the purpose for which a body of
information is to be used in order to define ap-
propriate organizations for that information.
As long as the purposes are unclear, or too
varied, consistent organizations will be diffi-
cult to achieve. The statement that a general
ontology of real-world knowledge should sim-
ply ‘represent’ that knowledge is underspec-
ified. It does not provide sufficient guidance
for finding useful organizations for that knowl-
edge. Given that we need a general organiza-
tion and that that organization will be deter-
mined by purpose, we clearly need a very gen-
eral (but still formally specifiable) task that
requires particular inferences to be performed.
If it were possible to find such a task, then
it would be possible to use it as a guiding
methodology for constructing general organi-
zations of knowledge. Precisely one such gen-
eral task is, of course, the expression of knowl-
edge in natural language: whatever the knowl-
edge that is represented, i.e., whatever do-
main and however general/specific, it should
be possible to express that knowledge linguis-
tically.3 One additional set of constraints that
one can apply in the construction of organiza-
tions of knowledge that attempt maximal ap-
plicability across domains is then that offered
by language.
This must be specified further. For ex-
ample, the acceptance of ‘ways of talking’
about categories as evidence for the existence
of those categories in an ontology is a very old
strategy (e.g., Aristotle) and is present even in
cyc. This method of justification is, however,
limited to seeing what one can say and still
make sense about a category rather than any
more technical analysis of linguistic proper-
ties. The precise ‘inferences’ that are being re-
lied upon to shape the organization are, there-
fore, still not being given. Thus, there are ex-
amples of ontologies that are constructed in
nlp systems, where there is a specified rela-
tionship between concepts and linguistic ex-
pression, but the relationship is sufficiently
non-general so as not to provide strong con-
straints on ontology design.
One such case is the ontology of kbmt
projects [Carbonell and Tomita, 1987] such as
translator [Nirenburg and Raskin, 1987].
Work of this kind seeks a level of represen-
tation that is minimally different across dis-
tinct languages. Moreover, the value of or-
ganizations of information that are relevant
across distinct domains is clearly recognized
3This is overstated to the extent that some in-
formation/knowledge is often maintained to be inex-
pressible linguistically — even if this is so, it is still the
case that by far the widest and most generally appli-
cable form of expression that we know is language. In
any case, whether or not there exists knowledge that
is inexpressible linguistically will not affect the final
outcome of the discussion below.
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and re-usable ontology portions are actively
sought. However, although the link to lan-
guage ensured by the machine translation
task increases the likelihood that this can be
achieved on a larger scale, the re-usable por-
tions of the ontologies proposed until now re-
main small. This can in part be attributed
to the fact that the appeal made to language
as a constraining force on ontology design is
undervalued.4 The ‘external-to-language’ at-
titude towards ontological constructs assumed
from ai promises to capture abstract models
of the world (or of conceptions of the world —
a difference that is not criterial at this point)
and its organization independent of particu-
lar languages. This appears a tempting di-
rection for achieving interlinguality. But then
we find ‘motivations’ such as the following for
the categories that are to be adopted within
an interlingual ontology:
‘Russian has no word that corresponds
exactly to the English word afford (as
in I can’t afford X or I can’t afford to
Y). In a multilingual processing envi-
roment, there might be a concept cor-
responding to a sense of the English
word afford. A Russian sentence Ja
ne mogu sebe etogo pozvolit’ (I can’t
allow myself this), uttered in a con-
text of acquisition . . . should involve the
concept that represents afford. This
means that if the units of the repre-
sentation language are chosen so that
they are based on Russian lexis, the
meaning of afford will be missing. But
this meaning seems sufficiently ba-
sic to be included in an ontology.’
[Nirenburg and Levin, 1991] [bold: my
emphasis].
It is clear that this kind of argumentation
needs to be sharpened considerably; it is also
clear that this can only be done when it has
been established exactly what function the
‘ontology’ is to serve. In general, the more
detailed the linguistic constraints adopted on
ontology design are, the more detailed and
explicitly justifiable that ontology design be-
4This is also made problematic by the very mul-
tilinguality of possible linguistic constraints inherent
in machine translation system — without appropri-
ate ways of achieving linguistic generalizations across
languages (cf., e.g., [Bateman et al., 1991] for discus-
sion), the application of linguistic constraints is very
much more difficult.
comes.5 However, the relationship between
ontologies and nlp is interestingly reflexive.6
Ontologies appear necessary for the organiza-
tion of knowledge appropriately for use by nlp
systems, and simultaneously the explicitness
of the necessary inferences that constitute an
nlp system provide an until now unrivalled
source of constraint for deciding on ontology
designs.
This connection is described well in the fol-
lowing citation from Ewald Lang:
‘. . . the structure of language plays a
dual role. It is, properly allocated to
the parsing and generating components,
a constitutive part of the object to be
modeled (that is, the system which is to
integrate linguistic and non-linguistic
knowledge). But at the same time it
is also part of the device by means
of which this object is accessed, that
is, the categorization of lexical items
into nouns, verbs, etc., provides an ap-
parently natural grid for establishing
corresponding sorts of entities in the
ontology, which, by definition, is to
represent non-linguistic common sense
knowledge. Given this, the risk of con-
fusing linguistic and non-linguistic cat-
egories is latent; moreover, it is practi-
cally unavoidable as long as we are con-
fined (or confine ourselves) to looking at
common sense knowledge through the
window of language only, i.e., without
a chance to draw on independent ev-
idence from non-linguistic (say, visual
or kinasthetic) ways of accessing the
structure and contents of common sense
knowledge.’ [Lang, 1991, p464]
5This was
also one result of an extensive study of proposed on-
tologies reported upon in [Skuce and Monarch, 1990].
Although there has also been at least one example of
development that has attempted movement in the op-
posite direction. The abstraction structure of BBN’s
natural language and understanding project janus
was redesigned away from a linguistically oriented de-
scription in order to find a ‘more general ontological
style’ [Weischedel, 1989, 200] that was not so strongly
connected with the linguistic realization of the con-
cepts defined. However, this very move was proba-
bly one contributing factor to the less than successful
outcome of the subsequent attempt to use the Long-
man Dictionary of Contempory English as the ba-
sis for defining a domain-independent taxonomy for
janus [Reinhardt and Whipple, 1988]. The most sig-
nificant generalizations that would have helped orga-
nize the taxonomy for the purposes of natural lan-
guage processing had probably already been lost.
6Or even circular: as I shall mention below.
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Thus, while linguistic patterns are probably
the richest source of organizational criteria
that are available to ontology design, their use
is certainly not unproblematic. Consequences
of this can be seen in the fact that although
the majority of recent and currently planned
natural language processing systems recognize
the necessity of some level of abstract ‘seman-
tic’ organization similar to an ontology that
classifies knowledge explicitly according to its
possibility for linguistic expression,7 very few
have achieved ontologies of any size and mo-
tivations for inclusion of particular concepts
and distinctions in ontologies remain limited
or underspecified. Thus, the decision to use
linguistic evidence by itself is still, unless fur-
ther restricted, underspecified and leaves open
a range of positions. These give rise to differ-
ing functionalities that the ontologies are to
serve, which hence impacts on ontology de-
sign. The positions and functionalities need
to be characterized more precisely and this I
attempt in the following section.
3 Three kinds of ontologies
Although I have concentrated until now on
preliminaries to the first problem area men-
tioned in the introduction — how knowledge
of the world is to be represented — the ap-
parent value of applying linguistic constraints
to this task renders the second problem area
— how that knowledge is related to language
— crucial. If the ontology cannot be related
to language in an explicit, formalized fash-
ion, then the structures (and functions) of
language will be prevented from having a di-
rect constraining influence on what gets rep-
resented in the ontology, what not, and how
the entire ontology is to be organized.
7Including, for example: the Functional Sen-
tence Structure of xtra: [Allgayer et al., 1989];
[Dahlgren et al., 1989]; [Emele, 1989]; the polygloss
project: [Emele et al., 1990]; certain of the domain
and
text structure objects of spokesman: [Meteer, 1989];
translator: [Nirenburg et al., 1987]; the Semantic
Relations of eurotra-d: [Steiner et al., 1987]; the
janus project: [Weischedel, 1989]; and the ontologi-
cal types of the acord project: [Moens et al., 1989].
Moreover, ontology-like organizations of informations
have also been found useful for parsing applications
by, e.g., [Calder et al., 1989, Chen and Cha, 1988,
Hinrichs et al., 1987, Zajac, 1989]. There are no
doubt many other places where this kind of construct
now appears.
There are at least two theoretically distinct
standpoints from which this second problem
area has been addressed in nlp systems. One
possibility is to assume that real-world do-
main knowledge is more or less directly linked
to grammatical and lexical forms of expres-
sion. The organization of the world knowledge
ontology should then, ideally, also be support-
ive of the use of that knowledge for linguistic
expression or for interpreting linguistic dis-
tinctions: the problem of relating knowledge
to language is thus subordinated to the world
knowledge ontology design. A second possibil-
ity is to assume that the relationship between
real-world domain knowledge and grammar
and lexis is itself complexly structured. This
structuring may lean for its organization to-
wards the world knowledge ontology, in which
case this would blend into the first possibility,
or towards the grammar and lexicon, or al-
ternatively could rely on its own principles of
organization. Each of these variants has been
adopted in some system where a concrete on-
tology has been attempted. This gives rise to
three distinct kinds of ontology that can be
found in nlp work. An ontology can be
• an abstract semantico-conceptual repre-
sentation of real-world knowledge that
also functions as a semantics for use of
grammar and lexis — this type I will term
a mixed ontology: Om;
• an abstract organization underlying our
use of grammar and lexis that is separate
from the conceptual, world knowlege on-
tology, but which acts as an interface be-
tween grammar and lexis and that ontol-
ogy — this type I will term an interface
ontology: Oi;
• an abstract organization of real-world
knowledge (commonsense or otherwise)
that is essentially non-linguistic — this
type I will term a conceptual ontology:
Oc.
The relationship involved here, their embed-
ding in general architectures, and the sub-
types of interface ontologies mentioned above
are depicted graphically in Figure 1.
3.1 Conceptual ontologies
Most of the ai designed ontologies — includ-
ing
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Figure 1: Three kinds of ontology in nlp
those of cyc, tacitus [Hobbs et al., 1987],
janus [Weischedel, 1989], ‘the naive seman-
tics’ of [Dahlgren et al., 1989], and even some
aspects of the kbmt
ontology, e.g., [Nirenburg and Raskin, 1987,
Nirenburg and Levin, 1991] — are attempts
to construct ontologies of the third type: pure
maximally language independent ontologies
reflecting the structure of the world. I have
already discussed some of the difficulties of
designing such ontologies without building up
through an account of language. Psycholog-
ical research might offer another source of
evidence for such ontologies; as would de-
tailed sociological work on the commonsense
world. It is, however, unclear whether any
such methodology will be able to avoid the
relationship to language observed above and
so I will now concentrate on ontologies which
are at least intended to be related explicitly
to language.
3.2 Mixed ontologies
An example of a mixed ontology — i.e., one
where there is no extensive treatment of the
relation between the world knowledge ontol-
ogy and grammar and lexis maintained sepa-
rate to the ontology itself — is the approach
taken in the lilog natural language under-
stand-
ing project [Herzog and Rollinger, 1991]; de-
tails of the ontology are given in, for exam-
ple, [Klose and von Luck, 1991, Pirlein, 1991,
Klose et al., 1991], and details of the rela-
tion between linguistic forms and concep-
tual representations are given in, for exam-
ple, [Gust, 1991, Bosch, 1991]. It may at first
glance appear strange to classify lilog here,
since the approach to the relation between
linguistic form and world knowledge draws
heavily on [Bierwisch, 1982]’s theory of se-
mantics where, to cite [Gust, 1991]’s state-
ment of Bierwisch’s position: ‘. . . semantic
forms and conceptual structures belong to
different and strictly discriminated levels’.
[Bosch, 1991] also makes it very clear that
he holds this distinction to be crucial for
making progress in semantics and knowledge
representation. However, when the mod-
elling of the approach is examined, we find
that this distinction of levels comes under
attack. For example, both semantic forms,
which are derivable from the lexicon and from
grammatical analysis, and conceptual forms
are represented in a single language (the se-
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mantic language being a subset of the con-
ceptual language: [Bosch, 1991, p248]) and
are freely combinable; moreover [Gust, 1991,
p133] maintains that: ‘there are continuous
variations between semantic forms and con-
ceptual structures.’ This gives rise to lexi-
cal entries which directly contain categories of
an ontology which also contains categories of
real-world knowledge. The relation between
conceptual knowledge and grammatical and
lexical form is thus handled by logically ma-
nipulating categories from a single ontology
until categories are found that possess links to
grammatical or lexical entries — this is pre-
cisely the architecture consistent with a mixed
ontology as shown in Figure 1.
An illustration of the nonseparation of of
‘linguistic’ information and ‘conceptual’ infor-
mation typical of ontologies of this type can be
seen in the following taken from [Bosch, 1991,
p251]. In order to find the interpretation in
context of the lexeme “school” as it is used,
arguably differently, in examples such as:
a. The school made a major donation.
b. The school has a flat roof.
A general ‘lexical semantic entry’ for the lex-
eme is retrieved thus:
SEM(‘‘school’’) = λX [PURPOSE X
W]
where
W =
PROCESSES OF LEARNING AND TEACHING
This is then interpreted by applying a given
‘contextualizing function’ selected depending
on the basis of the semantic interpretation of
the predicate in the lexicogrammatical repre-
sentation. Those for the example sentences
would be:
a. λX [INSTITUTION X & SEM X]
b. λX [BUILDING X & SEM X]
Combining the semantic entry and the con-
textualizing function gives the required ‘con-
ceptual’ concept that is the referent of the lex-
eme in context — i.e., that “school” is inter-
preted as either an institution or a building.
All of the undefined predicates found in these
logical expressions (e.g., institution, pur-
pose, etc.) are sorts defined in the ontology.
A direct link is therefore constructed from lex-
icogrammatical information and chunks of in-
formation appropriate for the conceptual level
of organization. As we shall see in Section 4.2,
this direct linking is a common property of
nlp systems based on the common notion of
‘semantics’ and arises out of a view of the lin-
guistic system that collapses together several
important distinctions.
3.3 Interface ontologies
The second and third types of ontology —
the interface and conceptual types — usu-
ally occur, at least theoretically, in the
same architecture. Although it is also
the case that some systems address them-
selves to the organization of the interface on-
tology without specifying how the concep-
tual ontology will look. This latter po-
sition is common for systems that are in-
tended as general purpose nlp systems re-
usable across different domains and appli-
cations. Examples of such systems include
both parsers and generators such as the Pen-
man system [Mann and Matthiessen, 1985,
Penman Project, 1989] and Mumble-
86 [Meteer et al., 1987]. Here the problem of
how to organize the interface with external
applications, where those applications are not
known in advance, has naturally focused at-
tention on organizations of information appro-
priate for interfacing. The approach to this
developed within the Penman project in terms
of theUpper Model has become more or less
typical of how this is achieved — although to
what extent this architecture has arisen inde-
pendently across systems is unclear. The ini-
tial formulation of the Upper Model was based
on work by M.A.K. Halliday [Halliday, 1982],
William Mann and Christian Matthiessen.8
The general statement of the interface prob-
lem for nlp systems is that machine-internal
information needs to be related to strategies
for expressing that information in some natu-
8The development of the Upper Model ontology,
from its inception as the Upper structure of the
janus project of ISI and BBN, up to its inclu-
sion as a standard component of the current Pen-
man text generation system is covered by the follow-
ing research reports: [Mann, 1985, Mann et al., 1985,
Moore and Arens, 1985, Bateman et al., 1990]. The
first detailed theoretical precursor to the ontology was
set out in 1985 by Halliday and Matthiessen as a gen-
eral organization for an experiential semantics: this
was called the Bloomington Lattice. The sub-
sequent development of the Upper Model has devi-
ated somewhat from the purely linguistically moti-
vated work; this will be discussed in more detail below.
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ral language. This could be done in a domain-
specific way by coding how the application do-
main requires its information to appear. This
is clearly problematic, however: it requires de-
tailed knowledge on the part of the system
builder both of how the generator controls
its output forms and the kinds of information
that the application domain contains. A more
general solution to the problem of defining a
mapping between knowledge and its linguis-
tic expression is to provide a classification of
any particular instances of facts, states of af-
fairs, situations, etc. that occur in terms of a
set of general objects and relations of specified
types that behave systematically with respect
to their possible linguistic realizations. This
classification has itself many of the properties
of an ontology, e.g., it is a hierachical organi-
zation of sorts and roles — although by virtue
of its motivation in linguistic realization, it
must be seen as a strictly linguistically mo-
tivated ontology. Examples here include as-
pects of [Meteer, 1989]’s Text Structure Ob-
jects in the spokesman text generator:
‘[i]t is important to remember that Text
Structure objects reflect the semantic
type of the expression of the informa-
tion in an object, not some intrinsic
type of the object itself.’[Meteer, 1989,
p21];
also the ontology of the acord system:
‘. . . the aim of the sort system is not
to reflect the characteristics of real
world objects and events referred to
by linguistic expressions, but rather
to systematize the ontological struc-
ture evidenced by linguistic expres-
sions’ [Moens et al., 1989, p178];
and, of course, the Upper Model of the Pen-
man system that I will describe in more detail
below.
The position that such an interface ontology
holds between surface details of a language
and more abstract knowledge is, however, an
uneasy one. As suggested above, it is possi-
ble to differentiate among such ontologies ac-
cording to whether they orientate themselves
more towards less abstract or towards more
abstract levels of representation. This brings
with it two potential problems in ontology de-
sign:
• the ontology can be too shallow, in that
it’s categories are a too direct recoding of
linguistic distinctions that do not achieve
a qualitative increase in abstraction;
• the ontology can be too deep, in that
it is no longer possible to draw any for-
mally specifiable connection between the
constructs posited and the linguistic evi-
dence taken as motivating them.
Both extreme situations occur and both re-
duce the value of the ontology as an effec-
tive interface medium. The former problem
will be accompanied by an increased difficulty
in linking the ontology to information of par-
ticular domains — regardless of whether this
information is considered as a separate kind
of information or as more specific details of
the same kind of information; and the sec-
ond problem will be accompanied both by an
increased difficulty in linking with grammar
and lexis and by the problems induced by
poorer linguistic constraints mentioned above.
The latter situation then often places a heav-
ier reliance on ‘internal’ or formal constraints
on organization (cf., e.g., [Weischedel, 1989,
Horacek, 1989] and what [Lang, 1991, p468]
terms ‘sortal’ restictions) which, while impor-
tant, do not provide sufficient grounds for de-
ducing very much detailed actual content by
themselves.
3.3.1 Interface ontologies that are not
abstract enough
Interface ontologies exhibiting the former
problem are very common and so it is worth-
while giving a slightly more detailed exam-
ple of the problems that arise. One such
ontology is that constituted by the seman-
tic relations used within the german compo-
nent of the eurotra project [Steiner, 1987,
Steiner et al., 1987,
Steiner and Reuther, 1989]. These relations
are a further development of earlier work by
Fawcett — particularly his work on transitiv-
ity in English (e.g., [Fawcett, 1987]). Fawcett
proposes a semantically motivated taxonomy
of process types, analogously to the approach
taken in [Halliday, 1985] but differing in the
actual categories adopted. Each process type
has some distinctive set of possible partici-
pants — the approach thus differs from early
accounts of semantic participants, such as
Case Grammar [Fillmore, 1968], where the
participant relationships were often defined
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separately from the processes in which they
participate, and further articulates concep-
tions of ‘thematic’ relations such as those
found in Lexical-functional grammar (cf.,
[Hale and Keyser, 1986,
Levin, 1987]) and Government and Binding
theory [Jackendoff, 1987]. The eurotra-d
work has made refinements to the proposed
taxonomy on the basis of multi-lingual ev-
idence, particularly from German, so as to
provide explicit syntactic tests for the assign-
ment of processes to each of the various pro-
cess types. It is then explicitly stated that
the resulting process types described are no
longer primarily semantic since their classifi-
cation is based exclusively on differentiation
by syntactic criteria. Therefore, although this
has produced a framework within which pro-
cesses can be classified according to the given
taxonomy with a high degree of inter-coder
consistency, which is an important criterion
in large distributed projects such as euro-
tra, its effectiveness as a step towards a
higher level of abstract information has been
restricted. This can be seen in the follow-
ing example of process classification given in
[Steiner and Reuther, 1989]. For the clause
That she gave no answer means that she
agrees with the proposal.
both subject and object are realized by that-
clauses and the only possible classification ac-
cording to the syntactic tests is then one of
a mental process with two phenomena. How-
ever, semantically the process also has strong
elements of a relation between the proposi-
tions involved. Similar examples in German
are the following: the verb retten . . . vor:
Daß er gut schwimmen konnte, rettete
ihn vor dem Ertrinken.
That he could swim well saved him from
drowning.
again resembles a relational process but has to
be assigned to mental according to the crite-
ria formulated; the process ‘reden’ (to speak,
talk), which would intuitively seem to be some
kind of communication verb, cannot enter into
constructions of the form:
* Peter redet: Karl kommt morgen
Peter speaks: Karl is coming tomorrow
and so does not receive a communication verb
classification: and the form:
* Peter redet, daß Karl kommt
Peter speaks that Karl is coming
cannot occur so it may not even receive a men-
tal reading — the only acceptable forms pos-
sible, e.g.:
Peter redet Unsinn
Peter speaks nonsense
Peter redet mit Paul Peter speaks with Paul
require an action classification, just as the cor-
responding English processes would. These
problems provide evidence that the syntactic
tests need to be made more subtle or more
elaborate in order to be able to reveal se-
mantic distinctions more reliably. In addition,
there is no account suggested of how this level
of representation can link to more abstract
levels of representation such as a conceptual
ontology.
A similar case of this probably contributes
to some of the difficulties that arise with
the use of ‘Lexical Semantic Structures’ (lss)
and [Jackendoff, 1983]’s ‘Lexical Conceptual
Structures’ (lcs) for translation — the for-
mer as described by [Dorr, 1991], the lat-
ter by [Nirenburg and Levin, 1991]. Both
structures are tightly bound to possible sur-
face forms by formally specified linking rules
(e.g., [Levin, 1987]). These rules partition the
lss or lcs into classes reflecting the different
realizational behaviour of their categories. Al-
though it is also then sometimes possible to
assign to these classes particular ‘semantic’
features this has still not yet been found to
be sufficiently abstract to support a motivated
construction of the corresponding conceptual
ontology — as the example of the motivation
for including the concept afford for Russian
that I cited above shows. The final selection of
conceptual ontological sorts in this case then
shows similarities both with that described for
lilog: i.e., by applying a mixture of lexical,
grammatical, and domain knowledge criteria,
and with the pure ai techniques of cyc and
others. In the longer term, therefore, similar
problems will occur.
As a final example of the problems of lack
of abstraction, I will mention some that have
arisen in our development and use of the the
Penman Upper Model. The Upper Model,
for reasons that I will describe below, does
succeed in being more abstract than the se-
mantic relations adopted, for example, within
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eurotra-d. The organization of an Upper
Model achieves greater semantic coherence,
grouping together distinctions that may be
used by a variety of distinct grammatical re-
sources in a grammar. For example, the re-
lationships between process and participants
may drive the organization of clauses, but
they may equally drive the organization of
head and modifiers in nominal groups. The
nature of the process-participant relationships
is not, arguably, altered by their realizational
form. Upper Model generalizations might
then express the commonality that unites the
following area of variation:
A shoots B
B was shot at T
the shooting of B by A
A’s shooting of B
B’s shooting
the shooting at P
the P shooting
the T shooting
etc.
under a single specification:9
process:
shoot(murderer:A,murdered:B,time:T,place:P).
Categories in the Upper Model are then cap-
turing generalizations which are not appropri-
ately expressed within the grammar. A fur-
ther example drawn from the 1989 version of
the Upper Model is the possible grammati-
cal realizations of the concept of generalized
possession. This concept should be seen as
being realized by possible selections from all
the grammatical systems to do with ‘posses-
sion’. Thus the semantics of the following
forms all make reference to this single Upper
Model concept.
the door’s handle
the handle of the door
the handle that the door has
the door handle
the handle is part of the door
etc.
For a more extensive sets of examples
of the lexico-grammatical variation that
the Upper Model is intended to support,
see [Bateman, 1989, Bateman, 1990a].
9Although the actual representation used in the
Upper Model reifies both predicates and the re-
lations holding between predicates and their ar-
guments; cf. [Mann et al., 1985, Hobbs et al., 1987,
Bateman et al., 1990].
This means that the Upper Model does suc-
ceed in achieving a sufficiently high degree
of abstraction as to be useful as an inter-
face medium. This increase in abstraction
also makes the ontology better suited to link-
ing with more abstract levels of information.10
The Penman system has been successfully in-
terfaced with a number of applications —
mostly expert systems, but also text planners
— where domain knowledge is represented. It
is then an example of an ontology that medi-
ates the relationship between lexico-grammar
and world knowledge without losing the neces-
sary formal connection with the grammar and
lexis. Moreover, it moves beyond problems
such as that recognized for the eurotra-d
classification of process types that11
‘The classification system proposed by
eurotra-d proceeds in a strictly syn-
tactic way. . . . From the standpoint
of generation this solution is problem-
atic: it would be preferable to have
a semantic classification that general-
izes across such surface syntactic sub-
tleties.” [Heid et al., 1988, p158]
To the extent that it is successful, this is pre-
cisely what the Upper Model provides. It
achieves this by being based very closely not
only on a particular, specified grammar — no
concepts are admitted into the Upper Model,
for example, unless they have a direct and
specifiable consequence for the operation of the
grammar—but also on a grammar which is it-
self already more abstract than a constituency
grammar. I shall describe this in more detail
below.
The Upper Model thus stands as a signif-
icant step forward in dealing with the prob-
lem of interfacing with a general nlp system.
The Upper Model decomposes the mapping
problem inherent in relating domain knowl-
edge with its possibilities for linguistic expres-
sion by establishing a level of linguistically
motivated knowledge organization specifically
constructed as a reponse to the task of con-
straining linguistic realizations. While it may
10So much so that it has sometimes been our ex-
perience that the domain model of some application
domains has been altered in the light of the consistent
organization that the Upper Model brings to bear.
11This problem arose while attempting to interface
the level of input specification for an existing genera-
tor of German (semsyn, cf.: [Ro¨sner, 1988]) with the
eurotra-d semantic relations.
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not be reasonable to insist that application do-
mains organize their knowledge in terms that
respect linguistic realizations — as this may
not provide suitable organizations for, e.g.,
domain-internal reasoning — we have found
that it is reasonable, indeed essential, that do-
main knowledge be so organized if it is also
to support expression in natural language re-
lying on general natural language processing
capabilities.
The general types constructed within the
Upper Model necessarily respect generaliza-
tions concerning how distinct semantic types
can be realized. We then achieve the neces-
sary link between particular domain knowl-
edge and the Upper model by having an ap-
plication classify its knowledge organization
in terms of the general semantic categories
that the Upper Model provides. This should
not require any expertise in grammar or in
the mapping between Upper Model and gram-
mar. An application needs only to concern it-
self with the ‘meaning’ of its own knowledge,
and not with fine details of linguistic form.
This classification functions solely as an in-
terface between domain knowledge and Up-
per Model; it does not interfere with domain-
internal organization. The text generation
system is then responsible for realizing the
semantic types of the level of meaning with
appropriate grammatical forms.12 Further,
when this classification has been established
for a given application, application concepts
can be used freely in input specifications since
their possibilities for linguistic realization are
then known. Interfacing with such a system
is thus radically simplified on two counts:
• much of the information specific to lan-
guage processing is factored out of the
input specifications required and into the
relationship between Upper Model and
linguistic resources;
• the need for domain-specific linguistic
processing rules is greatly reduced since
the Upper Model provides a domain-
independent, general and reusable con-
ceptual organization that may be used
to classify all domain-specific knowledge
12This is handled in the
penman system by the grammar’s inquiry semantics,
which has been described and illustrated extensively
elsewhere (cf., [Penman Project, 1989]) and see Sec-
tion 4.2 below.
when linguistic processing is to be per-
formed.
An example of the simplification that use
of the Upper Model offers for a text gener-
ation system interface language can be seen
by contrasting the input specification re-
quired for generators that work with realiza-
tion classes that are less abstract than those
of the Upper Model — such as, e.g., mumble-
86 [Meteer et al., 1987], or unification-based
frameworks,
such as [McKeown and Paris, 1987] and the
Lexical Functional Grammar (LFG) approach
of [Momma and Do¨rre, 1987] — with the in-
put required for Penman.13 Figure 2 shows
corresponding inputs for the generation of
the simple clause: Fluffy is chasing little
mice. The appropriate classification of do-
main knowledge concepts such as chase, dog,
mouse, and little in terms of the general se-
mantic types of the Upper Model (in this case,
directed-action, object, object, and size respec-
tively — cf. [Bateman et al., 1990]) automati-
cally provides information about syntactic re-
alization that needs to be explicitly stated in
the mumble-
86 input (e.g., S-V-O two-explicit-args,
np-common-noun,
restrictive-modifier,
adjective). Thus, for example, the classi-
fication of a concept mouse as an object in the
Upper Model is sufficient for the grammar to
consider a realization such as, in mumble-
86 terms, a general-np with a particular
np-common-noun and accessories of gender
neuter. Similarly, the classification of chase
as a directed-action opens up linguistic re-
alization possibilities including clauses with
a certain class of transitive verbs and char-
acteristic possibilities for participants, cor-
responding nominalizations, etc. Such low-
level syntactic information is redundant for
the penman input.14 Similar, illustrative in-
13Note that this is not intended to single out these
approaches at all, the problem is quite general and oc-
curs whenever there is no ontology available for orga-
nizing information at a more abstract level than that
imposed by the grammar. Further, as already noted,
most current nlp developments are moving in a direc-
tion analogous to that taken in our work on the Upper
Model.
14Moreover, when additional information is re-
quired, that information is supplied in semantic terms
rather than in terms of morphosyntactic labeling such
as :number plural — in this case this is represented
13
puts forms can easily be imagined for other
types of syntactically oriented grammar and
lexis components.
The further domain-independence of the
Upper Model is shown in the following ex-
ample of text generation control. Consider
two rather different domains: a navy database
of ships and an expert system for digital
circuit diagnosis.15 The navy data base
contains information concerning ships, sub-
marines, ports, geographical regions, etc. and
the kinds of activities that ships, submarines,
etc. can take part in. The digital circuit
diagnosis expert system contains information
about subcomponents of digital circuits, the
kinds of connections between those subcom-
ponents, their possible functions, etc. A typi-
cal sentence from each domain might be:
circuit domain: The faulty system is
connected to the input.
navy domain: The ship which was
inoperative is sailing to Sasebo.
The input specifications for both of these sen-
tences are shown in Figure 3. These spec-
ifications freely intermix Upper Model roles
and concepts (e.g., domain, range, property-
ascription) and the respective domain roles
and concepts (e.g., system, faulty, input, des-
tination, sail, ship, inoperative). Both forms
are rendered interpretable by the subordi-
nation of the domain concepts to the sin-
gle generalized hierarchy of the Upper Model.
This is illustrated graphically in Figure 4.
Here we see the single hierarchy of the Up-
per Model being used to subordinate concepts
from the two domains. The domain concept
system, for example, is subordinated to the
Upper Model concept object, domain concept
inoperative to Upper Model concept qual-
ity, etc. By virtue of these subordinations,
the grammar and semantics of the generator
can interpret the input specifications in order
to produce appropriate linguistic realizations:
the Upper Model concept object licenses a par-
ticular set of realizations, as do the concepts
in inquiry semantics by the inquiry response pairs
{:multiplicity-q multiple} and {:singularity-q nonsin-
gular}. This is also the case for ‘tense’ but I have
abbreviated the semantic specification here. For de-
scriptions of all these distinctions in detail, see the
penman documentation [Penman Project, 1989].
15These are, in fact, two domains with which we
have had experience generating texts using the Upper
Model.
quality, material-process, etc.16
Despite the progress that has been made
with the Upper Model as a potential interface
ontology, it is still the case that the mappings
between grammatical forms and the categories
of the Upper Model ontology are not yet rich
enough to ensure entirely appropriate seman-
tic classifications — entirely anologously to
the case with the explicitly syntactically ori-
ented categories of the eurotra-d semantic
relations. In an attempt to make the defini-
tions of the Upper Model concepts more acces-
sible to users of the Penman system, these def-
initions have been pushed towards an intepre-
tation of the Upper Model as predominantly a
hierarchy of generalizations about possible lin-
guistic realizations in English. This approach
permits a very straightforward control of the
grammar but compromises some of the seman-
tic integrity. Some simple examples of this
may be seen in the following.
In the then current version of the gram-
mar, the following clause, which is an ex-
ample that arose during development of Jo-
hanna Moore’s Program Enhancer Advisor
(pea) system [Moore, 1989]:17
X is defined as Y
had to be constructed from a process define
and an adjunct of ‘role-playing’ to produce
the prepositional phrase as Y. This contrasts
with a more semantically oriented discrimina-
tion of process types which could take, per-
haps, a process of ‘defining’ with three neces-
sary participants, a definer, a defined, and a
definition, and state how these are realized di-
rectly. In the realization class view as we have
it now, the process of defining has to be ex-
plicitly decomposed semantically at the level
of the Upper Model into a process and a rela-
tionship of role-playing. This is not intuitively
obvious: indeed, a user has to know how the
grammar generates as-prepositional phrases in
order to arrive at the ‘correct’ Upper Model
classification in order to be able to generate
the clause. This is dangerously close to the
amount of low-level syntactic detail that needs
to be provided for a Functional Unification
Grammar or Mumble-86.
16For further discussion of this simplification in the
semantic input specification for the sentence genera-
tor, see [Bateman, 1990b].
17All the PEA examples were provided in work by
Johanna Moore and Richard Whitney.
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(general-clause
:head (CHASES/S-V-O_two-explicit-args
(general-np
:head (np-proper-name "Fluffy")
:accessories (:number singular
:gender masculine
:person third
:determiner-policy no-determiner))
(general-np
:head (np-common-noun "mouse")
:accessories (:number plural
:gender neuter
:person third
:determiner-policy initially indefinite)
:further-specifications
((:attachment-function restrictive-modifier
:specification (predication-to-be *self*
(adjective "little"))) )) )
:accessories (:tense-modal present :progressive
:unmarked) )
Input to mumble-86 for the clause: Fluffy is chasing little mice
from: [Meteer et al., 1987]
(e / chase
:actor (e / dog :name Fluffy)
:actee (m / mouse
:size-ascription (s / little)
:multiplicity-q multiple :singularity-q nonsingular)
:tense present-progressive)
Corresponding input to penman
Figure 2: Comparison of input requirements for mumble-86 and penman
15
(v1 / connects
:domain (v2 / system
:relations (v3 / property-ascription
:domain v2
:range (v4 / faulty)))
:range (v5 / input)
:tense present)
Input for digital circuit example sentence:
The faulty system is connected to the input
(v1 / sail
:actor (v2 / ship
:relations (v3 / property-ascription
:domain v2
:range (v4 / inoperative)
:tense past)
:destination (sasebo / port)
:tense present-progressive)
Input for navy example sentence:
The ship which was inoperative is sailing to Sasebo
Figure 3: Input specifications from navy and digital circuit domains
This is not an isolated case. Other problem-
atic assignments in the pea domain include:
• The process call, as in “The boy is called
John”. Presently call is classified as a
dispositive-material-action from UM-89,
boy becomes the actee, and the name,
‘John’, becomes a recipient. No actor
is specified and so a passive construction
appears (due to a then current shortcut
defined for the textual reasoning that the
grammar initiates for selection of active-
passive clauses).
• The process generalize to, as in “The re-
sult can be generalized to other cases”.
Here generalize is again a straightforward
nondirected-action and to other cases is
specified as a destination spatio-temporal
circumstance in UM-89 in order to gen-
erate the preposition.
In all of these cases, the role assignments
are only being used in order to achieve the
required syntactic pattern given by the par-
ticular state of the grammar of the Penman
system: the Nigel grammar of English. In the
first example, the model for the clause being
used is that of give since this class of verbs
is bitransitive; in the second, the technique
adopted is as with the case of define as above,
where a circumstantial role is selected purely
in order to guarantee the desired preposition.
Although in these cases it is reasonably clear
that both grammar and Upper Model would
need to be extended to include the desired
process types, in general the theoretical sta-
tus of using arbitrary assignments of concepts
to the Upper Model and selections of roles to
be expressed has not been made sufficiently
clear. This technique is (or rather should)
only be employed when it is not possible to
extend the grammar and ontology appropri-
ately: only when the grammar has to be taken
as ‘fixed’, e.g., because it is being applied by
a user that does not have access to the inter-
nal organization of the grammar, is this kind
of strategy defensible. As a general technique,
the strategy has to be strongly rejected on the-
oretical grounds. However, note that without
a commitment to semantic coherence, there
is little reason not to use the Upper Model
in this way; we have already seen the similar
situation in the use of the eurotra-d sys-
tem of semantic relations where commitment
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Figure 4: Upper Model organization reuse with differing domains
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to semantic coherence has been explicitly re-
jected in favor of more readily operationalize-
able grammatical critera.
Another set of related problems arises when
semantically similar processes have different
syntactic realization. Consider, for example,
the two clause types:
x is like y
x resembles y
Although a user might wish to place these
similarly in the Upper Model, grammatically
they are rather different. The former requires
the grammatical features: {circumstantial-
attribute, manner-participant, be-intensive};
the latter has features: {circumstantial-
ascription, circumstantial-process}. In the
present Nigel grammar, these are dis-
tinguished by the inquiry circumstantial-
ascription-q, which would need to examine the
Upper Model. Therefore, in order to obtain
the differing syntactic structures a further dis-
tinction would need to be set up at the Upper
Model level.
The realization class view therefore makes
it difficult for users to formulate their input
specification to the system unless they know
precisely the form of linguistic expression that
they require. Since the realizational link be-
tween Upper Model categories and Nigel has
been made so tight for the very purposes
of achieving readily describable criteria, it is
sometimes (and increasingly once more users
attempt more varied modelling) necessary to
subordinate a concept in a counter-intuitive
position simply in order for the language re-
quired to result. This certainly undermines
the semantic integrity of the Upper Model as
an interface ontology and moves the entire
classification towards a less abstract level of
information. It needs to be remembered, how-
ever, that only when the grammar is fixed, is
a specific, determinate Upper Model required
— furthermore, that Upper Model is even par-
tially determined by the particular grammar
that is specified.
Finally, one further problem with the in-
terface ontology instantiated by the Penman
Upper Model lies precisely in the simplicity of
the relationship constructed betweeen domain
model and Upper Model. We have seen that
this is achieved by literally classifying (in the
formal sense of adding into the subsumption
lattice) domain model concepts in terms of the
categories from the Upper Model. Following
this operation, the Upper Model and the do-
main model form a single inheritance hierar-
chy and the domain concepts directly inherit
the possibilities for surface realization defined
for the Upper Model concepts. This opera-
tion is currently performed only once for each
domain and, while simplifying input expres-
sions, it means that the relationship between
domain and Upper Model is not being han-
dled particularly flexibly. In fact, once the
classification is complete, the complete ontol-
ogy can be interpreted as having collapsed
into a mixed ontology of the type described
for lilog: both particular domain concepts
and general linguistically motivated concepts
occur in the same subsumption lattice. This
treatment of the relationship between a po-
tential conceptual ontology, containing detail
knowledge of a domain, and the interface on-
tology, containing a semantic classification of
possibilities for linguistic expression, needs to
be made considerably more flexible to avoid
the problems of mixed ontologies described
both above and below.
3.3.2 Interface ontologies that are too
abstract
Interface ontologies exhibiting the problem of
being too abstract are more commonly found
in small scale systems: the problem of not be-
ing able to specify the mapping down to gram-
mar and lexis in a convenient and expandable
form often prevents large-scale development
from getting very far. Such projects (e.g.,
polygloss, acord and many others) begin
by adopting classes of categories developed,
for example, in analytical philosophy or nat-
ural language semantics — such as the event
types of [Vendler, 1967], temporal categories
such as those of [Moens and Steedman, 1988],
the semantico-‘conceptual’ predicates pro-
posed by [Jackendoff, 1983, Jackendoff, 1990],
event structures of [Pustejovsky, 1988], and
many others. As long as restricted grammat-
ical possibilities are entertained, for example
to enable research on particular focused areas
of semantics-syntax, then such ontologies are
adequate — even useful, since the focusing al-
lows greater depth in the semantic account to
be achieved. It should also be the case, how-
ever, that this work then feeds back into more
general and broader ontology work, and this
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happens much too rarely. It is also sometimes
unclear what the relationship of these ontolo-
gies would be to a more abstract conceptual
ontology — this may be expressed formally,
for example, in terms of a model-semantic the-
ory but the details are often left for future
work.
3.3.3 Brief discussion
It is clear that ontologies of the interface
type that are more closely bound to lan-
guage are nevertheless most useful for nlp
systems that want to deal with a wider va-
riety of actual language phenomena. The in-
crease in abstraction may not be so very great
in comparison to a desired conceptual ontol-
ogy, but it is nevertheless better than work-
ing with grammar and lexis directly. Such
work is also much more likely to be sta-
ble in the face of changing theoretical posi-
tions and more justifiable with respect to ac-
tual linguistic data. It is, then, natural that
one further type of nlp projects attacking
the problem of large-scale ontology construc-
tion is that of ‘dictionary’-oriented projects,
such as edr [Matsukawa and Yokota, 1991]
and acquilex [Calzolari, 1991]. The edr
project aims at producing a ‘concept dictio-
nary’ containing 400,000 ‘word senses’ for En-
glish and Japanese, and acquilex is con-
cerned with producing a re-usable ‘lexical
knowledge base’ that classifies entries accord-
ing to taxonomies of semantic categories and
relations between those categories. Both
projects have constructed sizeable semantic
taxonomies relying strongly on differences in
lexico-grammatical realization for the cate-
gories adopted. The taxonomy organization
and categories found in acquilex have simi-
larities to the view of lexical semantics pro-
posed by [Pustejovsky, 1991] where, again,
oppositions in linguistic behavior are an es-
sential motivating criterion. Another large
project partly leading up to this work, and
now related to the kbmt work mentioned
above, was the MIT Lexicon Project where
extensive classification of lexemes was under-
taken on the basis of the differing grammatical
patterns that the lexemes may enter into.
Although the construction of large knowl-
edge bases at this level of abstraction is bound
to offer a definite improvement in our abil-
ity to rely on linguistic motivations in future
ontology design, their availability will not of
itself bring about that design. It is still neces-
sary to consider methodologies for using such
information so that appropriate ontologies for
general nlp use can be constructed. There-
fore, in the next section I will relate the kinds
of ontologies that we have seen in this section
to compatible linguistic theories. Without a
broader view of what is being done linguisti-
cally when categories for a particular kind of
ontology are proposed, I believe it is unlikely
that progress will be made. As long as the
categories developed are sufficiently close to
the surface details of language to remain ob-
jectively verifiable, i.e., remain in the realms
of syntax and lexico-grammatically oriented
interface ontologies, useful classifications can
be constructed. For more abstract levels, how-
ever, the support of theory become crucial for
defining methodologies, questions, and possi-
ble solutions.
4 Linguistic support (or
otherwise) for the ontol-
ogy types
In this section, I will follow the ordering of the
discussion of ontology types of the previous
section: i.e., first linguistic theories compat-
ible with the design of mixed ontologies will
be mentioned, followed by the kind of linguis-
tic theory that is more supportive of distinct
interface and conceptual ontologies. I will not
raise the issue here of the relationship between
‘conceptual ontologies’ and possible linguistic
theories, since one of the defining phrases that
is often used about this level of abstraction is
its very extra-linguisticness. This does, how-
ever, depend on the view of the linguistic sys-
tem that is adopted and I will mention some-
thing about this later. Finally in this section,
I discuss some disadvantages of the former ap-
proaches when considered as a methodology
for developing the kinds of resources neces-
sary for nlp systems.
Before beginning the discussion, I should
however briefly note the motivation for an
exclusion of forms of semantics such as sit-
uation semantics, model-theoretic semantics
of various kinds, etc. below. Such accounts
are not immediately relevant to the discus-
sion at hand precisely because they have not
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been concerned with the construction of rep-
resentations that are directly supportive of
ontologies. That is, regardless of whether
the formal account of semantics proposed
in some particular framework contains sets
of predicates that are of mixed ontological
status, or are purely conceptual, or purely
(linguistically) semantic, we find one crucial
component of ontological engineering miss-
ing. Those categories are not typically built
up into subsumption lattices of sorts shar-
ing various general properties of use for fur-
ther domain classification. It is clear that
many of these theoretical approaches could
easily move in this direction, and with the
increased use of sorts in linguistic theory at
all levels of description some first steps have
been taken (e.g., [Sag and Pollard, 1991,
p78], [Nerbonne, 1992]). However, as pointed
out by [Onyshvekych and Nirenburg, 1991]:
‘The crucial point is that in order to
have an explanatory power, the atoms
of [a] meaning representation language
must be interpreted in terms of an in-
dependently motivated model of the
world. Moreover, if any realistic ex-
periments have to be performed with
such an nlp system, this world model
(sometimes called an ontology) must be
actually built, not only defined alge-
braically.’
Therefore, until the problem of ontology con-
struction on a realistic scale itself becomes an
issue for an account, that account remains of
less central concern for the current discussion.
4.1 Mixed ontologies and lin-
guistic theory
The closest linguistic approaches to support
mixed ontology design such as that found in
lilog are, perhaps surprisingly, those com-
patible with the work of [Jackendoff, 1983,
Jackendoff, 1990]. Jackendoff adopts the po-
sition that the semantic level of representa-
tion with which he is concerned is also con-
ceptual, i.e., common to modalities such as
language and vision [Jackendoff, 1983]. As
pointed out by [Herweg, 1991], approaches
that directly link syntax with conceptual in-
terpretation now occupy a rather standard po-
sition in mainstream linguistics and so there
are many approaches that could be described.
That of Jackendoff is probably one of the
most developed and well known in this di-
rection, although there are also similarities
to be drawn with work in Cognitive Linguis-
tics [Langacker, 1987, Talmy, 1987] and direc-
tions such as that of [Wierzbicka, 1988]. All
of these approaches share an orientation to
language as an instrument for revealing facets
of conceptual organization. This is stated
most clearly by Jackendoff in terms of what
he terms the Grammatical Constraint:
‘. . . it would be perverse not to take as
a working assumption that language is
a relatively efficient and accurate en-
coding of the information it conveys.
To give up this assumption is to refuse
to look for systematicity in the rela-
tionship between syntax and semantics.
A theory’s deviations from efficient en-
coding must be rigorously justified, for
what appears to be an irregular rela-
tionship between syntax and semantics
may turn out merely to be a bad theory
of one or the other.’ [Jackendoff, 1983,
p404]
Given his equation of semantic structure and
conceptual structure, this becomes largely
equivalent to statements such as the follow-
ing describing the basic claim of of cognitive
linguistics:
“... across the spectrum of languages,
the grammatical elements that are en-
countered, taken together, specify a
crucial set of concepts. This set is
highly restricted: only certain concepts
appear in it, and not others. . . [This]
set of grammatically specified notions
collectively constitutes the fundamental
conceptual structuring system of lan-
guage. That is, this cross-linguistically
select set of grammatically specified
concepts provides the basic schematic
framework for conceptual organization
within the cognitive domain of lan-
guage.” [Talmy, 1987, p165/6]
This position also appears in the approach
of Pustejovsky to the relation between lex-
emes and their interpretation in context; as
he writes,
‘The meaning of words should somehow
reflect the deeper, conceptual struc-
tures in the system and the domain it
operates in. This is tantamount to stat-
ing that the semantics of natural lan-
20
guage should be the image of nonlin-
guistic conceptual principles (whatever
their structure).’ [Pustejovsky, 1991,
p410]
These approaches are all described by the first
architecture depicted in the diagram of Fig-
ure 1. Each suggests that there is a portion
of the conceptual ontology that has a direct
linguistic connection and that that portion
should have just the same kind of organization
as the rest of the conceptual ontology. A spec-
ification of the semantics of some expression
is simultaneously a (possibly partial) specifi-
cation of a conceptual specification. Again,
this state of affairs receives a very explicit de-
scription from Jackendoff:
‘This account of the syntax-semantics
correspondence gives a principled ac-
count of the level of “argument struc-
ture” found in various versions of GB
and LFG ... - a level of linguistic rep-
resentation that lists the arguments of
a verb, with or without their θ-roles.
Such a list can now be simply con-
structed from the set of indices in the
conceptual structure of the verb, and
there is one index per syntactically ex-
pressed argument... In short, “argu-
ment structure” can be thought of as
an abbreviation for the part of concep-
tual structure that is “visible” to the
syntax.’ [Jackendoff, 1983, p404/5]
By virtue of the Grammatical Constraint,
therefore, Jackendoff adopts a very close bind-
ing of linguistic analysis and categories at
his semantico-conceptual level of represen-
tation: available linguistic realizations and
patternings lead directly to the positing of
corresponding categories and relationships
at the level of semantic/conceptual struc-
ture. In Jackendoff’s case, the linguistic ev-
idence admitted is organized in terms of X-
theory [Chomsky, 1980, Jackendoff, 1977] and
so close correspondences appear between cat-
egories of this theory and categories of the
semantic/conceptual structure. In particular,
he states that:
1. “... every major phrasal constituent in
the syntax of a sentence corresponds to
a conceptual constituent that belongs to
one of the major ontological categories.”
2. “... the lexical head X of a major phrasal
constituent corresponds to a function in
conceptual structure — a chunk of the
inner code with zero or more argument
places that must be filled in order to form
a complete conceptual constituent. The
argument places are filled by the readings
of the major phrasal constituents strictly
subcategorized by X.” [Jackendoff, 1983,
p67]
Thus, he suggests the following approxima-
tion to conceptual structure for the sen-
tence The man put the book on the table
[Jackendoff, 1983, p68].


event
put(
[
thing
the man
]
,
[
thing
the book
]
,

 place
on(
[
thing
the table
]
)

)


This structure, if we ignore the textual in-
formation represented abbreviated here with
the, shows striking similarities with the in-
put specification described earlier for Penman
(cf. Figures 2 and 3). The structure may
be glossed as stating that a predicate put of
type event holds over three arguments: the
first two are of type thing, the latter is an
on-relation of type place. Each of the pred-
icates are taken to be defined as semantico-
conceptual categories motivated primarily by
linguistic patterning. Further examples of the
motivation of semantico-conceptual categories
from linguistic evidence is the following list of
example categories offered by Jackendoff:
Interrogative probe supports category:
a. What did you buy? [thing]
b. Where is my coat? [place]
c. Where did they go? [direction]
d. What did you do? [action]
e. What happened next? [event]
f. How did you cook the eggs? [manner]
g. How long was the fish? [amount]
Subsequently, further categories of differentia-
tions are made working from intuitions on the
meanings of sentences and their constituents
supported by example sentences. Moreoever,
analogously to the perceived relationship be-
tween syntactic structures and rules for their
well-formedness, Jackendoff takes the position
that the inter-relationships between the se-
mantic/conceptual categories will also be ex-
pressed in terms of well-formedness rules. An
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example for the category [path] is as follows
[Jackendoff, 1983, p166]:
[path] →

Path


to
from
toward
away-from
via


({
[Thing y]
[
Place
y]
})


The combination of a number of rules such
as these begins to define a hierarchy of inter-
related categories analogous to the standard
hierarchical organization that I have assumed
appropriate for ontology construction.
A comparison of Jackendoff’s semantico-
conceptual categories with, for example, the
superficially very different categories arising
from cognitive linguistics is very illuminating
concerning the role that motivations from lan-
guage can play for ontology construction. The
general methodology of proponents of cogni-
tive linguistics is to examine ‘grammatical’ el-
ements — however these come to be defined—
in order to uncover the conceptual organiza-
tion they presuppose. For example, Talmy of-
fers the following break down of the this/that
distinction in English.
‘A closed-class element of this type
specifies the location of an indicated ob-
ject as being, in effect, on the speaker-
side or the non-speaker-side of a con-
ceptual partition drawn through space
(or time or other qualitative dimen-
sion).’ [Talmy, 1987, p168]
This is summarized as:
• a ‘partition’ that divides a space into ‘re-
gions’/‘sides’
• the ‘locatedness’ (a particular relation) of
a ‘point’ (or object idealizable as a point)
‘within’ a region
• (a side that is the) ‘same as’ or ‘different
from’
• a ‘currently indicated’ object and a ‘cur-
rently communicating’ entity.
By sampling across a wide range of languages
the Cognitive Grammarian compiles a list of
such distinctions and attempts to provide in-
ternal organization and structure rooted in a
presumed linguistically relevant area of con-
ceptual organization. The flavor of this orga-
nization can be seen in the following examples
of proposed categories from Talmy.
Dimension “The category of ‘dimension’ has
two principal member notions, ‘space’ and
‘time’. The kind of entity that exists in space
is — in respectively continuous or discrete
form — ‘matter’ or ‘objects’. The kind of
entity existing in time is, correspondingly,
‘action’ or ‘events’. . . ” [Talmy, 1987, p174].
This is schematized as:
dimension continuous discrete
space : matter objects
time : action events
Plexity ‘Plexity’ is a generalization of notions
such as singular and plural to cover actions
also. For example:
matter action
a. uniplex A bird flew in. He sighed (once).
b. multiplex Birds flew in. He kept sighing.
Boundedness ‘Boundedness’ is a generalization
of notions such as mass and count with re-
spect to nouns to include again actions in ad-
dition to objects. This Talmy relates to im-
perfective and perfective and similar terms in
the treatment of verbs. Essentially, “[w]hen
a quantity is specified as ‘unbounded’, it is
conceived as continuing on indefinitely with
no necessary characteristic of finiteness in-
trinsic to it. When a quantity is specified as
‘bounded’, it is conceived to be demarcated
as an individual unit entity.” ([Talmy, 1987,
p178]). Similar, far more formal, expressions
of this idea can now be found in a number of
approaches (e.g. [Krifka, 1989]).
Dividedness “A quantity is ‘discrete’ (or
‘particulate’) if it is conceptualized as
having breaks, or interruptions, through
its composition. Otherwise, the quan-
tity is conceptualized as ‘continuous’.”
[Talmy, 1987, p180]
These categories hold of a given ‘quantity’
simultaneously and so classify that quantity
along the dimensions described. Moreover,
different linguistic consequences are intended
to follow from each distinction. Although
there are many interesting distinctions sug-
gested which could help enrich proposed on-
tologies along a number of dimensions, the
lack of an accepted, detailed grammatical
framework nevertheless limits the generaliza-
tions that can be found. Langacker claims
that:
“. . . basic grammatical categories such
as noun, verb, adjective, and ad-
verb are semantically definable. The
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entities referred to as nouns, verbs, etc.
are symbolic units, each with a seman-
tic and a phonological pole, but it is
the former that determines the catego-
rization. All members of a given class
share fundamental semantic properties,
and their semantic poles thus instanti-
ate a single abstract schema subject to
reasonably explicit characterization. A
noun, for example, is a symbolic struc-
ture whose semantic pole instantiates
the schema [thing]. . . In a similar fash-
ion, a verb is said to designate a pro-
cess, whereas adjectives and adverbs
designate different kinds of atemporal
relations.” [Langacker, 1987, p189]
Although with the proposed conceptual cat-
egories restricted in this way to follow from
grammatical categories that are so directly
‘observable’, i.e., often inflectional and word-
based such as singular and plural, mass and
count, nouns and verbs, etc., one would not
expect a particularly rich ontology, in fact, a
large number of finely differentiated categories
are set up — primarily on the basis of con-
trastive examples that do not rely on detailed
syntactic analysis. This shows conclusively
the value of examining a very wide range of
natural occuring examples, in contrast to the
oft criticised (e.g., [Rohrer, 1986]), but nev-
ertheless still prominent, tendency in main-
stream linguistics to study constructed ex-
amples in areas that illuminate the currently
fashionable linguistic phenomena. Neverthe-
less, the lack of a formally specifiable mapping
between the categories proposed and linguistic
realization renders the consequences of estab-
lishing any particular set of categories almost
impossible to investigate and this is certainly
less of a problem in a contrasting account such
as that of Jackendoff where the relation to a
detailed account of grammar and lexis is al-
ways clear. The value noted above of being
able to test out and justify proposed categories
for ontologies formally applies here strongly.
Jackendoff is able, therefore, even on the basis
of rather limited linguistic breadth of motiva-
tion, to suggest a more detailed set of cate-
gories and interrelationships. The semantico-
conceptual representations are substantially
more abstract than syntactic classes (as ev-
idenced by the generalizations that they per-
mit to be drawn) but are nevertheless tied
reasonably precisely with possibilities for lin-
guistic expression. An ideal situation would
therefore be to have a very broad, detailed
and formally specified grammar, capable of
describing very fine-grained grammatical and
lexical differences.
Even despite the lack of formally speci-
fied mappings to linguistic form within cog-
nitive linguistics, there has still been at
least one significant application of its pro-
posed concepts in a computationally con-
text. This is in their use to provide a sys-
tem of semantic features for stating mean-
ings to be preserved across languages in
machine translation [Zelinsky-Wibbelt, 1987,
Zelinsky-Wibbelt, 1988]. Although the work
suffers from the lack of explicit definition
that the conceptual categories have so far re-
ceived — making it difficult for coders us-
ing the semantic features reliably to clas-
sify the meanings that are involved — this
situation may be improved significantly by
some current work in progress18 which is in-
tended to improve the necessary connection
between the semantic categories and their
linguistic realization. The situation apply-
ing Jackendoff’s categories in a computational
context has, as would be expected, been
more straightforward. A number of proposals
have been made for such an application, and
some have been implemented. For example,
[Meteer, 1988] comments on the possible or-
ganization of abstract linguistic terms at the
text message level for the sentence generator
Mumble-86 that a system such as Jackendoff’s
could provide and we have already seen that
both [Dorr, 1987, Dorr, 1990]’s work on the
unitran translation system and approaches
within kbmt [Nirenburg and Levin, 1991]
have implemented aspects of the semantico-
conceptual structure.19
18For example by Cornelia Zelinsky-Wibbelt and
Wiebke Ramm of IAI/Eurotra-D on syntactic tests
that coders could apply to resolve difficult cases.
19Further analogous areas of research which often
fall somewhere between the explicit grammatical foun-
dation attempted by Jackendoff and the, until now,
more impressionistic linguistic motivations of Lan-
gacker and others, include the large body of work
on the ‘conceptualization’ and linguistic expression of
spatial-temporal information, e.g.: [Herskovits, 1986,
Bierwisch and Lang, 1989] and many others.
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4.2 Interface ontologies and lin-
guistic theory
In contrast to the accounts of the previous
section, the separation of information found
in the interface ontology and a more abstract
conceptual ontology is consonant with theo-
retical positions that assume a higher degree
of stratification in the linguistic system. The
mixed ontology view goes well with a stan-
dard syntax-semantics-pragmatics distinction
where ‘semantics’ includes the conceptual rep-
resentation and ‘pragmatics’ provides pro-
cedures that operate over the semantico-
conceptual representation to produce active
interpretations in context. In this sense, prag-
matics is not a further stratum in a linguis-
tic system and has a distinct theoretical sta-
tus to that of syntax or semantics. In con-
trast to this, the interface ontology architec-
ture suggests at least a three-way stratifica-
tion between lexico-grammatical information,
semantic information, and a contextualizing
level of ‘conceptual’ information. Each of
these strata appears to have rather similar
formal properties: most of the information of
each, for example, would appear to be repre-
sentable as a subsumption lattice defined over
sorts, possibly augmented with structured in-
heritance.20
I have already mentioned one view of the
linguistic system that seems compatible with
this stratification: the approach to seman-
tics and context proposed by [Bierwisch, 1982,
Bierwisch and Lang, 1989] that acted as one
influence for the lilog design — even though
the final specification of the ontology within
lilog does not seem to have remained in
the spirit of this theory. Within the linguis-
tic model of Bierwisch, conceptual represen-
tations are maintained strictly separate from
semantic representations, and semantic ex-
pressions are used to constrain construction
of conceptual expressions during interpreta-
tion. Thus, ‘words’ (actually lexicogrammat-
ical patterns) are related to semantic forms
which determine functions from contexts to
conceptual structures. The distinction be-
tween the two levels in this kind of two-level
semantics is nicely summarized by Michael
Herweg as follows:
20Current work in information-based syntax makes
this point for syntax [Pollard and Sag, 1987].
‘Semantic representations are struc-
tured configurations of semantic units
which, on the one hand, are deter-
mined by the grammatical system of
the language in question and, on the
other hand, are grounded in — or
motivated by — the conceptual sys-
tem. . . . Conceptual representations
are structured configurations of concep-
tual units, which are mental representa-
tions of certain aspects of the external
world.’ [Herweg, 1991, p152/3]
The two classes of categories — the semantic
and the conceptual — thus have very different
theoretical statuses and allow very different
kinds of motivations. This is therefore pre-
cisely the kind of structuring of the linguistic
system that one requires to support the use of
interface and conceptual type ontologies.
The most successful of the interface ontolo-
gies described in Section 3.3, the Penman Up-
per Model, clearly has a natural relation to
the stratification found in this kind of ‘two-
level semantics’. For example, the sorts of the
Upper Model are determined by the gram-
matical system (concretely, the Nigel gram-
mar component of the Penman system) as is
required. Although there is also a relation-
ship to be drawn with accounts that are ex-
plicitly seeking semantic organizations closely
linked to language regardless of these organi-
zations’ further embedding at higher levels of
abstraction,21, the relation between a proper
view of the Upper Model and two-level se-
mantics becomes even closer when we exam-
ine instead of the Upper Model, rather the
theoretical position of which the Upper Model
is only a very partial instantiation: i.e., that
of systemic-functional theory [Halliday, 1961,
Halliday, 1978,
Matthiessen and Halliday, forthcoming].
Systemic-functional theory is a highly strat-
ified general linguistic theory with respect to
which the Penman text generation and its de-
scendents have been, and continue to be, de-
veloped. In some ways perhaps analogously
to the situation in lilog, many aspects of the
current implementation of the Penman system
are not accurate instantiations of that theory.
Of particular importance here is the very in-
stantiation of the concept of linguistic strata
21Or, alternatively, by seeking an embedding in an
account such as model-theoretic semantics to ‘bottom
out’ in a formally specifiable way.
24
— since it is precisely this construct which
is necessary for motivating the kind of multi-
levelled representation that we find in inter-
face ontologies and their contextualizing con-
ceptual ontologies.
The notion of stratification in systemic-
functional theory is depicted diagrammati-
cally in Figure 5. The linguistic system
is broken down here into three strata: lex-
icogrammar, semantics, and context. Be-
tween each stratum the same relationship
— that of realization — holds. Systemic-
functional theory is essentially a functional
theory, i.e., one that is concerned crucially
with the functions that language fulfills in
particular contexts, and this informs the un-
derstanding of the realization relationship be-
tween strata as follows. Each higher-level (i.e.,
more abstract) stratum is seen as providing
the functional motivation for the next lower-
level stratum; and each lower-level stratum is
seen as providing a resource that generalizes
across the possibilities of the next-higher stra-
tum [Halliday, 1978]. This gives us a more de-
tailed view on how strata in the linguistic sys-
tem interact than that usually found in strat-
ified accounts. Additionally, each higher-level
stratum is seen as contextualizing the levels
beneath.
The organization of the Penman-style ar-
chitecture version of systemic theory instan-
tiates the stratification as follows. Near-
est the surface there are realization state-
ments of syntagmatic organization, or syntac-
tic form. These statements are classified in
terms of their potential for expressing commu-
nicative functions that are realized grammati-
cally, such as asserting/questioning/ordering,
active/passive, etc.: this denotes paradig-
matic organization and is represented in terms
of a grammatical system network. This or-
ganization captures the possible alternatives
that are available given any choices that
have already been made; i.e., a collection
of ‘paradigms’ of the form ‘a linguistic unit
of type A is either an A of functional sub-
type X, or an A of functional subtype Y, . . . ,
or an A of functional subtype Z’ are given.
At each level these subtypes are disjoint and
serve to successively classify linguistic units
along ever more finely discriminated dimen-
sions. This formulation of classifications in
terms of increasingly fine discrimination is
in systemic-functional linguistics termed the
principle of delicacy. The grammatical com-
municative functions are then in turn moti-
vated by semantic distinctions that classify se-
mantic circumstances according to the gram-
matical features which are appropriate to ex-
press those situations: this classification is the
combined responsibility of choosers and in-
quiries [Mann, 1983]. Finally, the possibili-
ties for classification that the inquiries have
are defined in terms of the abstract ontol-
ogy of the Upper Model. In relation to Fig-
ure 5, then, the Penman-style architecture
represents a computational instantiation only
for the lower two strata and the relationship
between them.
While at a rather general level very simi-
lar to the breakdown proposed by Bierwisch,
the systemic-functional account also goes into
more detail about the internal organization of
each stratum. It is this feature which is largely
responsible both for the more abstract status
that has been achieved for the sorts of the Up-
per Model and for the early adoption of the
principle of motivating sources on the basis
of the grammar. Not only is all grammati-
cal variation captured by abstract choices be-
tween minimal grammatical alternatives, but
also all such abstract choices must have ex-
plicit motivations, or semantic conditions, de-
fined. Only then is the grammar fully defined
as a resource for grammatical expression: we
have to know what each grammatical possi-
bility is an expression of. This has naturally
given rise to the notion of covering the gram-
mar in terms of a set of motivations for each
choice that the grammar offers. This is de-
picted graphically in Figure 6. The categories
necessary for this motivational covering are
then organized into sorts in a subsumption
lattice — thus defining the Upper Model.
It is worth noting that this provides a
very strong methodology for interface ontol-
ogy construction. Until a grammar alterna-
tion is explicitly connected into a motivational
relationship, the alternation is considered to
be only formally (in the sense of linguistic
form) defined. The grammar in fact acts as
a (highly structured) list of phenomena that
require semantic motivation. In addition, the
functional organization of the grammar itself
goes a long way towards providing a useful
pre-classification of syntactic phenomena so
as to be amenable to systematic semantic in-
terpretation. The extra boost in abstraction
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that the grammar offers is responsible for the
increased level of abstraction that the Upper
Model has already achieved.
I have noted, however, that the Upper
Model does not instantiate the full organi-
zation required by the theory. Some of the
consequences of this have already been men-
tioned. For example, the upwards relations
of the Upper Model to context has not been
modelled within Penman in terms of a ‘real-
ization’ relationship: domain models are di-
rectly subordinated to the Upper Model hi-
erarchy. I will return to this and some other
problems below. Importantly, since the full
input of the theory has not yet been taken
into account, we have available a number of
possible directions for development that may
provide a far more sophisticated implementa-
tion of both interface and conceptual ontolo-
gies.
4.3 A comparative evaluation
In this section, I will apply the possible lin-
guistic theoretical underpinnings that could
be provided for the different ontology types in
order to consider those ontology types more
critically. I will suggest here that there are
clear reasons for dispreferring accounts that
adopt a mixed ontology approach. Subse-
quently, in the next section, I will discuss
possible future developments for interface and
conceptual ontologies drawing further on the
connections to theory established.
We have seen that the type of account based
on a style of argumentation such as that of
Jackendoff manages to gain abstractness while
still maintaining contact with details of lin-
guistic realization. I have noted that the in-
crease in abstraction is a generally necessary
property for improving the functionality of
nlp systems. One of the principle differences
between such an account and the linguistic
theories supportive of interface ontologies was
in the degree and explicitness of stratifica-
tion. One can ask the question, therefore,
is there any evidence for the more stratified
view of the linguistic system? If it proves nec-
essary, or beneficial, to differentiate between
information that is particularly linguistic and
the kind of information sought in accounts of
real-world, commonsense knowledge, then a
mixed ontology will not be sensitive to this. A
very important issue to address is, therefore,
whether the selection between a mixed ontol-
ogy and a more differientiated set of interre-
lated ontologies is one which is still open to de-
bate, or arbitrary — or are there grounds for
deciding for one architecture over the other.
4.3.1 Populating a mixed ontology
If we assume that we have an account such
as that proposed by Jackendoff, possibly aug-
mented by a range of concepts from cognitive
linguistics with a more formally expressed re-
lationship to the lexicogrammar, it is still the
case that there the resulting ontology is not
yet very large. The number of general sorts
that occur in, for example, [Jackendoff, 1990]
(i.e., not the conceptual equivalents of lexical
items, which seem to be introduced freely),
is less than 40: these include predicates such
as event, state, be, orient, path, go,
with, from, to, towards, inchoative, re-
act, affect, etc. Most conceptual items are
decomposed into these ‘primitives’. I will
not discuss whether or not these items are
good candidates psychologically for concep-
tual primitives, but relying on this small set of
categories is unlikely to capture many general-
izations of linguistic expression when a broad
lexicogrammar is considered. If we include ex-
perience such as that obtained within the de-
velopment of the lilog ontology or the Upper
Model, many intermediate sorts will express
useful generalizations over distinct linguistic
patterns. Relying on a smaller than neces-
sary set of categories either misses general-
izations or places more work on the mapping
with lexicogrammatical form. The method-
ological question arises of how the sort hier-
archy is to be extended beyond the very gen-
eral categories that most attempts at ontol-
ogy construction assume as basic on intuitive
grounds.
The primary source of evidence for exten-
sion is the classification of lexicogrammati-
cal patterns. This posits semantic features
that co-occur with particular classes of Lex-
ical Conceptual Structures. But these classes
are constructed on the purely syntactic lin-
guistic behaviour of the investigated lexemes.
This, while being the best methodology avail-
able and one I have defended throughout this
paper, cannot itself be expected to give rise
to conceptual classes. Only the assumption
that such semantic patterns are simultane-
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ously conceptual makes this plausible: there
is no obvious connection to be drawn between
aspects of domain and commonsense knowl-
edge and lexically derived categories. The
latter are often subject to criticism for be-
ing too shallow even for an interface ontol-
ogy: they must appear very unlikely can-
didates for a conceptual ontology. As we
have found with the problems with the Upper
Model (Section 3.3.1), there is no guarantee
that particular domain-motivated categories
will choose lexically-motivated categories that
belong to a consistent more general ontologi-
cal type. More often items belonging to very
different lexical classes are treated as seman-
tically equivalent for speakers’ expressive pur-
poses. Representing this in a single ontology
then requires that concepts may be consis-
tently classified along the two dimensions si-
multaneously: which complicates the formal
properties of the resulting ontology consid-
erably since exactly what may be inherited
where becomes unclear.
This is shown concretely in the linguisti-
cally motivated evaluation that [Lang, 1991]
undertakes for lilog. There he examines the
sorts proposed for the ontology according to
the kinds of motivations accepted for their in-
clusion. He finds the following differentially
motivated sorts all combined in the single sub-
sumption lattice:
• ‘Conceptually based sorts’ which are in-
cluded on extra-linguistic (conceptual)
grounds.
• ‘Text base specific sorts’ which are con-
cepts corresponding to special vocabulary
items required by the particular domain
and text with which lilog as a project
was concerned.
• ‘Sorts projected from the grammar’
which are notions found in the grammar,
such as preposition, transferred to the on-
tology.
• ‘Sorts of mixed origin’ which are concepts
where both extra-linguistic and linguistic
criteria are involved.
This mixing of motivations organizes itself
loosely according to the vertical and horizon-
tal dimensions in the hierarchy. Thus,
‘The vertical structure of the sort hier-
archy, which is based on the subsump-
tion relation, draws mainly on the avail-
ability of corresponding linguistic la-
bels categorized as nouns . . . or as verbs
. . . However, the horizontal dimension
of the sort hierarchy, that is the selec-
tion of subsorts to be assigned to a com-
mon supersort, is mainly determined by
features that emerge from our extra-
linguistic conceptual knowledge of ob-
jects and spatio-temporally specifiable
events or situations . . . ’ [Lang, 1991,
p466/7]
Lang shows the following problems for the
resulting organization in a single subsump-
tion lattice that this inconsistency, or variety,
of motivations for concepts in the hierarchy
creates. First, since extra-linguistic or con-
ceptual criteria are less than well understood,
there is a degree of arbitrariness in the catego-
rizations that appear. Second, it is never clear
from the concepts that are found in the hier-
archy alone whether they are to be expected
to have a corresponding linguistic effect or
not. Third, the co-existence of distinct kinds
of concepts means that the precise meaning of
‘subsumption’ with respect to particular cases
is underspecified — different kinds of concepts
have different relations between their ‘wholes’
and their ‘parts’ and until this is clarified it
is unclear what kind of subsumption actually
holds. These differences entail different formal
properties so that different objects can call for
different inheritance properties. Thus, for ex-
ample, a supposedly general ‘part-whole’ re-
lation is intended sometimes as ‘is a compo-
nent of’, sometimes as ‘is spatially included
in’, somtimes as ‘pertains to’, sometimes as
‘inalienable possession’, sometimes as ‘alien-
able possession’, etc. This range of possibil-
ities makes the inferences that in fact follow
from any statement in the ontology far more
difficult to foresee and substantially compli-
cates in any case any axioms for inference that
are designed.
This can also be seen concretely in many
versions of semantics where a mixed on-
tology is relied upon — in order to han-
dle the very flexibility of the relationship
between the concepts that are to func-
tion for the linguistic expression, and those
which are not, complex and often uncon-
strained mechanisms are introduced: the
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‘projective inheritance’ of [Pustejovsky, 1991]
and many instances of ‘type coercion’
as used by, e.g., [Sag and Pollard, 1991,
Pustejovsky, 1991] are probably prime exam-
ples of this, but there are many others. A
mixed ontology is, therefore, a very weakly
constraining theoretical construct, which does
not provide optimal assistance either for the-
ory construction or for system construction.
4.3.2 Stratification
The just mentioned flexibility of relationship
between conceptual categories and the cate-
gories that are determinative of their linguis-
tic realization is a very typical property of a
relationship between linguistic strata. It is
this very flexibility, in fact, which provides the
primary linguistic evidence for stratification.
As an example of this, consider the following
issue of ontological design.
Regardless of whether a mixed ontology is
adopted or not, some portion of some on-
tology is assumed which offers an expression
of the chunking that language expects and
demands of knowledge if it going to be ex-
pressible through the grammatical and lexi-
cal resources of the linguistic system. One
question that can be asked, therefore, is: is
the information in a conceptual ontology that
will support this chunking already organized
in this way or not? If it is then it will
be straightforward to construct a mechanism
such as that suggested by Jackendoff above,
whereby one simply ‘takes a view’ on some
conceptual structure and already has a spec-
ification of the semantic predicate-argument
structure which can in turn control the gram-
mar and lexis to produce appropriate results.
If not, however, then some reorganization of
the structure will be necessary. In all ex-
amples that are presented of alleged concep-
tual structures that are already appropriate
for direct lexicogrammatical realization, e.g.,
by viewing as predicate-argument structure,
we can make the following observations:
First, the lexical items and class of gram-
matical patterns appropriate is already so
highly constrained as to follow directly from
the expression; for example,
[State orient ([Thing weathervane], [Path
north])]
as one reading for the sentence: The weath-
ervane pointed north [Jackendoff, 1990, p74].
Certain variability in lexicogrammatical ex-
pression will be produced by the mapping
rules of syntax formation, but other decisions,
including: the choice of word for the concept
weathervane given that the hearer might not
know what a weathervane is, or that the sen-
tence may be uttered among world-experts
on the subject of weathervanes who would
normally select a far more restrictive descrip-
tion, etc. have already been built into the de-
scription. Widely differing selections of pos-
sible expression according to text type, reg-
ister, formality, situation, time availability
(cf. [Hovy, 1988, Bateman and Paris, 1]) are
excluded.
Second, the granularity of the correspond-
ing language has also been built into the de-
scription. For example, we know that a sen-
tence is going to be produced (or if the linking
rules are good enough: a sentence or a nom-
inalization) rather than a short discussion of
the wind’s effect on an object whose position
of equilibrium under the pressure of the wind
serves as an indication of the wind’s direction.
A nice example22 of maximal flexibility here
might be the difference, for example, in the
language produced in response to the concep-
tual real-world category beer for the purposes
of a dictionary entry, e.g.,
‘Beer is a bitter alcoholic drink made
from grain. There are a lot of different
kinds of beer.’ [Collins cobuild En-
glish Language Dictionary, 1987]
and that produced for the purpose for an entry
in an industrial chemical encyclopedia, which
goes on for 40 pages.
The response to both of these problems
within the semantico-conceptual approach is
straightforward: the differences are expressed
beforehand in the semantico-conceptual orga-
nization and are produced by conceptual pro-
cesses for information organization and man-
agement. But this misses the generalization
that regardless of the information to be ex-
pressed that same linguistic granularity is im-
posed: there will be a set of descriptions of
some predicate with an argument structure,
including specifications of participants and
circumstances. The two sentences concerning
beer in the dictionary and the hundreds in the
22Due to Karin Haenelt.
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encyclopedia all exhibit the same kind of orga-
nization. Knowledge is variable scale, but lan-
guage is predominantly fixed-grain,23 as de-
fined by the grammar. This means that for
all the knowledge available in the semantico-
conceptual ontology, there need to be con-
struction mechanisms available which convert
some selected fragment of the information, of
any scale, and produce an appropriate sized
chunk of semantico-conceptual structure for
motivating a sentence.
With unconstrained inferencing across the
knowledge base this may be achievable
by inheriting constraints back from the
grammar and checking the equivalence of
constructed semantico-conceptual structures
with the originally selected fragment. But,
crucially, for all such selected fragments, the
same class of ‘semantico-conceptual’ para-
phrases will be potentially available: i.e.,
those licensed by their grammatical express-
ability. Furthermore, also regardless of the
originally selected semantico-conceptual frag-
ment, the lexico-grammatically licensed set
of ‘semantico-conceptual’ specifications gov-
ern specifiable sets of inferences that oper-
ate only on such specifications: for exam-
ple the inferences that determine the tex-
tual variations that are appropriate when
realizing the specification lexicogrammati-
cally [Bateman and Matthiessen, to appear],
that certain abstract semantic classifications
apply for which there is no conceptual ev-
idence [Schriefers, 1990], and others. Thus,
not representing this distinguished set sepa-
rately fails to capture a significant generaliza-
tion about the organization of the linguistic
system as a whole.24
23Apart from the resources for combining clauses,
nominal groups, etc. into ‘complexes’, which are not
relevant to the current argument.
24It is also engenders dubious nlp system design;
factoring out the commonalities in a separate stratum
is analogous to the following application of object-
oriented programming:
“In an object-oriented application . . . the
system uses predefined mappings from ob-
jects to the routines that know how to pro-
cess those objects (or can choose among dif-
ferent routines depending on the context).
The efficiency of using predefined mappings
for known types comes in drastically reduc-
ing or entirely eliminating search; the onus
is put on the developer to define the de-
cisions available to a type at each level,
rather than presenting all options at all
times and letting a search procedure find
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that this
flexibility between strata is typical and not
unique to the relation between semantics and
conceptual levels of representation. The re-
lationship between, for example, the Upper
Model and the lexicogrammar already ex-
hibits much of the same kind of flexibility. For
example, the expressive resources of the gram-
mar of nominal groups is not restricted to the
single grain-size of sorts that are subtypes of
an Upper Model sort object. It is equally pos-
sible to realize Upper Model classified events
as nominal groups or configurations of events
as single clauses if the textual conditions are
appropriate. [Bateman and Paris, 1] present
other examples of this theoretical flexibility
for other categories in the grammar. It is not
at all surprising given the theoretical similar-
ity, therefore, to find exactly this kind of flex-
ibility again between the sort lattice of the
semantic ontology and that of the conceptual
ontology.
This discussion of stratification is summa-
rized in Figure 7. Here we see three strata and
the repeated variability in expression that any
selected semantic specification has. Crucially,
the common, reoccuring coding possibilities
that are available for all elements from the
conceptual stratum are not repeated at that
level, but are factored into a single statement
at the level of the semantic interface with a
mapping from sorts at the conceptual stra-
tum to sorts at the interface stratum. Not
representing this generalization both guaran-
tees a complication of the theory and makes
a usable nlp system based on the theory un-
likely. Again, the power of the theory to bring
methodological and contentful constraints to
bear on system design is compromised.
5 Some Principles and
Methods; and some for-
mer puzzles resolved
The discussion up to this point has attacked
mixed ontologies on the basis that they are
internally inconsistent, and has criticised the
non-statificational linguistic accounts under-
lying such mixed ontologies on the basis that
the best one.” [Meteer, 1989, p6]
This is also one property of using an interface ontology
such as Meteer’s or the Upper Model.
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Figure 7: Capturing generalizations via stratification
they fail to capture theoretically important
and practically useful generalizations. Both
weaknesses have one consequence in common:
they provide a seriously reduced set of con-
straints for ontology design and construction.
Since one purpose of this paper is to sug-
gest principles and methodologies for ontol-
ogy construction, mixed ontologies and under-
stratified linguistic accounts are clearly to be
avoided. The kinds of ontologies most appro-
priate for nlp systems and for which linguis-
tic support needs to be sought can now be
restricted to the following two types.
• Type Oi: an abstract semantic organiza-
tion underlying our use of grammar and
lexis that is motivated on essentially lin-
guistic grounds and that acts as a com-
plex interface between lexicogrammatical
resources and higher-level strata in the
linguistic system — the categories of this
interface should be maximally general,
i.e., apply across distinct real-world situ-
ations, but specific enough to maximally
constrain possible lexicogrammatical ex-
pression.
• Type Oc: an abstract organization of
real-world knowledge (commonsense or
otherwise) that relates downwards to the
interface to lexicogrammar.
With these restrictions in place, I will now
go further and suggest some particular guide-
lines for ontology construction. In order to
do this, however, it is also necessary to make
some further commitments to the kinds of in-
formation that will be made available at par-
ticular levels in the linguistic system. The rea-
son for this is that the linguistic, and particu-
larly lexico-grammatical, constructs are essen-
tial for guiding ontology design. This follows
the increasingly wide range of linguistic the-
ories that are returning to the position that
the relation between grammar and semantics
is not arbitrary; we saw a selection of these
in Section 4 above, e.g., [Langacker, 1987,
Talmy, 1987, Wierzbicka, 1988,
Jackendoff, 1983, Halliday, 1978]. If we ac-
cept this, then it is also to be accepted that
the selection of particular accounts of lexi-
cogrammar has consequences for the subse-
quent ontology design. Since such conse-
quences cannot be avoided, it makes sense to
make selection decisions in ways which will
maximally help in the task of ontology con-
struction overall. I will distinguish between
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decisions in the following two areas:
• type of grammar
• contents of grammar
and will make some firm suggestions for the
former and discuss the consequences of differ-
ences that arise in the latter.
First, we can note that the most successful
interface ontology developed so far is prob-
ably that of the Upper Model. The Upper
Model has achieved both a detailed account
and a generally applicable account. We can
ask, then, what is it about its underlying the-
oretical organization that let this occur? Sec-
ond, we can further note that although the
Upper Model is the most detailed instantia-
tion of an ontology of type Oi that has been
developed, is nevertheless not a full instan-
tiation of the theory on which it is based.
It is therefore worthwhile considering briefly
what additional constraints the theory could
bring to bear if it were to be more fully im-
plemented.
The kind of grammar on which the ab-
stractions proposed in the Penman Up-
per Model is easily classified. It is a
paradigmatic-functional grammar exhibiting
the standard Hallidayanmetafunctional diver-
sification [Halliday, 1985, Matthiessen, 1990,
Matthiessen and Bateman, 1991].
This means that it is organized, firstly around
choice — the paradigms of grammatical con-
structions that stand in functional opposition
— and second around a factorization of that
choice according to its semantic motivation:
is the choice to do with the propositional con-
tent of the linguistic entity to be classified
(ideational), is the choice to do with the tex-
tual placing of the linguistic entity to be clas-
sified (textual), or is the choice to be classified
as to do with the interpersonal relationship
between speaker and hearer or with the atti-
tude of the speaker towards the information
expressed by the linguistic entity (interper-
sonal). The motivations for the choices pro-
vides hypotheses concerning the sorts neces-
sary for controlling those choices. The Up-
per Model has been derived by considering
motivations for those choices exclusively as-
signed to the ideational metafunction: there is
no mixing of categories across metafunctional
domains.25
This builds into the design of an ontology
motivated in such a way as the Upper Model
the following features.
First, we require an ontology that is sig-
nificantly more abstract than syntactic real-
ization classes. I have already suggested how
this has been achieved with the Upper Model.
The grammar, being organized in terms of a
functional classification of possible constraints
on constituency structure, is already more
abstract than constituency structure per se.
Further classification across the paradigms
uncovered is then automatically more abstract
and achieves a generalization across particu-
lar lexico-grammatical contexts that supports
a greater flexibility of expression of input
expressions. The strict relationship to the
grammatical stratum also makes sure that the
kinds of mixed sorts that [Lang, 1991] finds
and criticises in the lilog hierarchy cannot
occur: either an (interface, i.e., semantic) on-
tological category has a specified consequence
for lexico-grammatical expression or it is not
accepted.
Second, given the stratification suggested
by the theory the Upper Model is automat-
ically only the ‘next level up’ in the linguistic
system: it is an ontology strongly connected
to grammar below. It does not, by itself, pro-
vide the necessary organization of higher level
ontologies. Thus, in short, we see that an or-
ganization closely reminiscent of a two-level
semantics is automatically achieved, and that
both levels require ontologies.
Third, we have seen that it is a design
goal that an ontology be as general as pos-
sible — that it helps with classification across
domains, tasks, and applications, but also
be substantial enough to provide a rich scaf-
folding for domain description. This raises
the question: How can we guarantee that
a proposed ontology is as general as we re-
quire? We can now see that ontologies such
as the Upper Model, which are based on
motivations from grammar, are guaranteed
to have the domain-independence required
25Although it is perfectly possible to imagine ap-
plying the same ‘grammar-as-filter’ methodology on
underlying motivational ontologies as carried out for
the ideational metafunction — cf. [Bateman, 1991] for
examples of this applied to the textual metafunction
and [Matthiessen and Bateman, 1991] for general dis-
cussion — the resulting organizations of information
have very different properties.
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of them. Since ontological categories are
motivated by the grammatical distinctions
(and not by more arbitrary lexical collec-
tions found in a given domain), those cate-
gories are forced to be at least as general as
the grammatical categories. It is, therefore,
very unlikely that [Klose and von Luck, 1991,
p462]’s claim that the lilog ontology has a
‘more domain-independent status’ than the
early version of the Upper Model described
in [Mann et al., 1985] would apply to current
versions of the Upper Model.
But we can go further and move beyond
the kind of generalizeability that refers sim-
ply to domain-independence — which is gen-
eralizeability ‘upwards’ in the linguistic sys-
tem, and beyond generalizeablity across the
lexicogrammar — which is generalizeability
‘downwards’ in the linguistic system. When
we also consider the metafunctional organi-
zation of the linguistic system posited by
systemic-functional theory, then we can see
that generalizations both across ‘text in-
stances’ and across ‘speech functions’ are also
guaranteed — i.e., generalizations ‘horizon-
tally’ across the same stratum of the linguistic
system. This is depicted graphically in Fig-
ure 8. These constraints rule out certain other
potential sorts from the ontology, e.g., sorts
concerned with the particular appearance of
an entity at a given position in a text or with
the speaker’s attitude towards an event. Cer-
tain of the sorts found in [Meteer, 1989]’s in-
terface ontology are good examples of the for-
mer kind. Having such sorts requires reclas-
sification of domain information whenever a
domain object is used in a text, since the tex-
tual statuses of domain objects changes over
the development of a text — i.e., from new to
given, from theme to rheme, etc. This change
of course needs to be represented: the point
is that representing such information in the
interface ontology again mixes very different
kinds of information — although this time on
a ‘horizontal’ dimension across the linguistic
system rather than a ‘vertical’ one.
The kind of grammar that we employed as
the initial motivation for guiding the develop-
ment of the Upper Model has, therefore, gone
a long way towards ensuring that the prop-
erties desired of ontologies obtain. But an
area of flexibility in the description then arises
from the depth of grammatical description,
i.e., the contents, rather than the type. Par-
ticularly within the systemic-functional ap-
proach, lexical descriptions are seen as more
specific versions of grammatical descriptions
— there is no difference in kind. Thus, if we
push lexicogrammatical description further in
the direction of lexis, we automatically push
further the depth of motivating semantic on-
tology constructs that are needed. This bi-
furcation in potential description needs more
theoretical work before we can make any firm
statements about whether it is more helpful
to pursue one at the expense of the other, or
whether they should be pursued in parallel as
has been the case with the more general area
of the grammar.
We can now also consider some possible im-
provements and explanations for some awk-
ward phenomena/intuitions that have previ-
ously hindered ontological engineering. For
example, if there is a stratification of the kind
argued for, why is it that suggestions for con-
ceptual structure that have been put forward
in a number of approaches appear also to be
candidates for representation as sorts in the
interface ontology? — When the categories of
the Upper Model, for example, are examined,
many similar classes to the proposed ‘concep-
tual’ ontology work are to be found.
To give a concrete example of this,
[Lang, 1991, p474], after careful discussion
concerning the problems of a mixed ontol-
ogy, defines some basic assumptions con-
cerning the structure of the conceptual on-
tology drawn from earlier work, includ-
ing [Bierwisch and Lang, 1989]. With respect
to these assumptions, he outlines the following
set of conceptual domains which are to form
basic subsorts of the conceptual ontology:
D1: objects; D2: substances; D3: locations;
D4: time intervals; D5: events; D6: attitudes
We can also note here similarities with some
of the classes above from [Jackendoff, 1983,
Jackendoff, 1990, Langacker, 1987,
Talmy, 1987], etc. But these are also sorts
already found, for example, in the Penman
Upper Model, where they have been entered
purely on the grounds that they are necessary
to directly constrain possible grammatical re-
alizations. Is it the case that the claim we saw
above by [Gust, 1991, p133] that: ‘there are
continuous variations between semantic forms
and conceptual structures’ is, after all, true?
Can we introduce strict stratification and still
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Figure 8: Capturing generalizations via metafunctionality
account for the intuition that these concepts
indeed function at different strata?
Lang already suggests that there may be
certain genuinely ‘linguistic’ features that
function definitionally for features at the ‘con-
ceptual’ stratum:
‘. . . the representation of nouns like
Ofen [oven], Fahrzeug [vehicle], Boot
[boat] in the lexicon contains a spe-
cific component purpose (hence, an el-
ement of our linguistic knowledge) by
means of which the sort Nutzgegenstand
[article for practical use] in the knowl-
edge base is being accessed. This is but
one example of how linguistic aspects
of lexical representation can be made
use of in defining ontological sorts in the
knowledge base.’ [Lang, 1991, p470]
Other ‘genuine linguistic features’ that Lang
suggests for the basis of the ontological dis-
tinctions include: ‘bounded object’ vs. ‘non-
bounded object’, ‘concrete object’ vs. ‘ab-
stract object’ — both very similar to other
theoretical accounts. We can now go further
and explain the relation between the linguistic
(semantic) ontology types and the conceptual
ontology types as follows.
All of the reasoning that we have applied
to the development of the Upper Model ontol-
ogy with respect to its motivation in the lexi-
cogrammar can be applied precisely to the re-
lation between the Upper Model ontology and
some higher stratum ontology. This follows as
a consequence from the theoretical statement
of the nature of realization within the strat-
ified linguistic account. This means that we
will need to find motivations for the seman-
tic interface ontology sorts. It also means,
however, that we can make use of the realiza-
tion relation starting from the standpoint of
the higher stratum and interpret the status of
the semantic interface ontology as generalizing
across different conceptual stratum situations;
cf. Figure 5. Thus, for both the lexicogram-
mar with respect to the semantic interface on-
tology, and for the semantic interface ontology
with respect to the conceptual ontology, it is
likely that the more general intra-stratal or-
ganization of the lower stratum is likely to be
echoed in the overall intra-organization of the
higher stratum. This gives us the observed
link between constructs that are motivateable
as general semantic concepts and constructs
that appear to organize the conceptual hier-
archy. There is, then, no ‘mixing’ of the cat-
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egories of different strata, there is just a res-
onance or echo of categories at one stratum
taken up at another.
Given both this theoretical and practi-
cal binding of the contents of the dif-
ferent strata, is it clear why there is
then a certain tension between strata —
as [Klose and von Luck, 1991, p462] note
from their experience with the lilog ontol-
ogy:
‘The tension between linguistic and in-
ferential demands on the modeling is
alive and forces compromises on both
sides.’
I have suggested that the kind of view of re-
alization between strata found in systemic-
functional linguistics, where there is both a
practical and a theoretical ‘pulling’ in both
directions — upwards to context and down-
wards to (experiential) lexicogrammar, of-
fers an appropriate way of operating within
this tension between strata. The resulting
methodology then uses the tension to help
constrain organization decisions for the con-
struction of interface ontologies that are use-
ful for nlp and to remove the need for genuine
‘compromises’ where an inappropriate cate-
gory is postulated at one level because that
level is insufficiently functionally differenti-
ated from others.
It is clear, however, that we know a great
deal more about possibilities for ontologies of
type Oi than we do about ontologies of type
Oc. Moreover, given the results of the last
section, perhaps we know even less than we
thought — clearly conceptual categories are
now sometimes best reappropriated to a more
abstract semantic type. This is a less than
ideal situation — particularly given the view
of stratification shown in Figure 5 and the es-
tablished dialectic between strata. Because
the realization relationship between strata is
bi-directional, we should be able to use a
higher-strata to constrain our accounts at a
lower-strata. But the fact that we know very
little about the higher-strata in this case re-
moves one source of possible constraint.
Finally, here, however, I will draw atten-
tion to one interesting consequence for the
status of the higher-stratum ontology when
we take into account the bi-directionality of
the inter-stratal relationship. Since there is
no difference assumed in the theoretical sta-
tus of the levels related by the interstratal re-
lationship, one might ask how it is that the
interface ontology is termed ‘linguistic’ and
‘semantic’, whereas the higher-stratum ontol-
ogy is ‘non-linguistic’ and ‘conceptual’. I be-
lieve that a far more appropriate view of the
relationship is as depicted graphically in Fig-
ure 9. All strata that stand in an interstratal
relationship of the kind explored and used in
this paper should be seen as semiotic levels
of greater and lesser degrees of abstraction.
The conceptual ontology thus becomes more
of a contextual ontology, with context being
interpreted in the sense of a level of social
situation — closely in line with, for exam-
ple, [Halliday, 1978]. There is, then, the ad-
ditional question of how this entire complex
of inter-related levels of semiotic descriptions
relates to the supporting conceptual system
of human psychology. This is probably a very
different kind of relation than realization —
although it will probably again turn out to be
a dialectic relationship rather than a one-way
determination. This puts us in the position
to criticise some of the conceptual sorts pro-
posed by Lang on exactly the same grounds
that he has criticised mixed ontologies. For
example, alongside the above mentioned do-
mains, all of which may be more plausi-
bly ground in the conceptual/perceptual sys-
tem, [Lang, 1991, p474] places: ‘social insti-
tutions (law, administration, marriage, edu-
cation)’ and communicative behaviour (eti-
quette, conversation, group dynamics). Such
a mixed set of sorts is unlikely to form a very
stable or usable ontology: it is probably cru-
cial to begin to refine further our levels of
ontology, and their interactions, so that the
mistakes made at the least abstract levels of
ontological engineering are not just repeated
again, at the next level ‘up’. More detailed
statements must, however, be left to future
research!
6 Summary, conclusion
and final words
This discussion of this paper has considered
the notion of ‘ontology’. Starting from the
view that an ontology is an organization of
the world — which has been approached
by ‘naive physics’, ‘conceptual dependencies’,
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Figure 9: The relationship between semiotic descriptions and conceptual representation
‘commonsense (meta)physics’, and others — I
drew attention to the fact that such accounts
do not bring strong methodological and sub-
stantive constraints to bear on ontology con-
struction. Also unclear is the relationship of
such ontologies to language. The gap is of-
ten so large that this level is too abstract
to have any direct relationship to required
forms of expression. Contrariwise, this gap
also leads to a weakening of the discriminative
power of the constraints that can be brought
to bear by linguistic patternings. Concretely,
then, one cannot, for example, generate nat-
ural language directly from such levels of de-
scription without resolving, or ‘fixing’ an im-
mense number of degrees of freedom that re-
main unaddressed (often quite rightly, if this
is seen as a conceptual ontology) in the on-
tology itself. Much of the work that an nlp
system requires to be done is, therefore, sim-
ply not taken into consideration by the ab-
stract ontology. Such ontologies are also, be-
cause of their abstractness, difficult to popu-
late reliably — if sizeable and potentially dis-
tributed resource construction is undertaken,
as it increasingly is, then this virtually guar-
antees poor intercoder consistency. In short,
such ontologies are of very limited value for
nlp work.
These problems have been noted by some
of those who have sought principles for on-
tology design (cf. [Skuce and Monarch, 1990])
and those who need real shareable resources
(as for example in machine translation —
cf. [Steiner and Reuther, 1989]). The only so-
lution that has been found to this endeavor is
to place more reliance on language as a source
of constraint. For this reason, then, views on
language and the organization of the linguis-
tic system become crucial for ontology design
that is appropriate for nlp. Moreover, only by
taking views on the linguistic system that are
maximally supportive of the functionalities re-
quired of ontologies can we avoid problems of
lack of abstractness (i.e., being dominated by
linguistic form) and problems of too much ab-
stractness (i.e., being dominated by semantic
theories of particular areas that lack connec-
tion to linguistic form). In short, ontological
engineering faces the following dilemma: in-
terface ontologies
• need to be abstract, large-scale, re-usable
information classification devices,
• but they cannot be too abstract,
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• or too near syntax,
• and need to be constrained from lan-
guage.
The theoretical assumptions and resulting or-
ganizational decisions that I have pursued in
this paper appear to offer a very practical way
of preceding within this state of affairs. I have
also shown that several other beneficial prop-
erties for nlp systems are derivable from the
abstract organization of the linguistic system
that systemic-functional theory posits.
The paper has presented for broader debate
a round of discussion that begun in the con-
text of the developing ontology of the Penman
text generation system. This work, begin-
ning with the pre-computational descriptive
account, called the Bloomington Lattice by
Halliday and Matthiessen has passed through
several instantiations in computational form.
Now future work will have again consider
bringing together the linguistic descriptive
account — reworked to a new level of de-
tail in [Halliday and Matthiessen, to appear]
— and the computational model. It is to be
hoped that this approach will build on the for-
mer success of the Upper Model, simultane-
ously moving us in some of the directions that
I raised as responses to problems with the Up-
per Model. Thus, I have not suggested that
the Upper Model we find in Penman is the
‘general solution’ to ontological engineering —
there are many more criticisms to be made of
this ontology, again mostly concerning the ex-
tent to which it succeeds as an instantiation of
the theoretical principles that underlie it. The
function of the ontology is also more finely cir-
cumscribed than many others — but again
strictly according to the underlying theory.
We are not yet at a stage where an ontology
can be accepted, even pragmatically for the
needs of current nlp systems, as ‘complete’:
what is more at issue is the development of ap-
propriate methodologies for constructing on-
tologies, and here again constraints offered by
the linguistic system are of paramount impor-
tance. The linguistic system, when viewed
appropriately, gives a rich multidimensional
set of constraints on adequate and appropriate
designs for computational systems. The prin-
ciple dimensions applied in this paper were
those of strata and metafunctions. This by no
means exhausts the possible input of the the-
ory, however. For further dimensions of the
theory, see [Matthiessen and Bateman, 1991];
for additional examples of using these dimen-
sions to constrain computational system de-
sign, see [Bateman et al., 1992]. I hope that
the paper has suggested some of the benefits
of employing such linguistic motivations, and
that further attempts to apply wider sets of
motivations will help us in the future.
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